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NAFTA, Capital Mobility and Mexico's Financial System
I.  Introdiuction
1.  On November 17, 1993, the United States ratified the North American Free Trade
Agreement treaty.  Debate continues as to the effects of this treaty on both capital inflows and
outflows and their composition, and the implications for the Mexican financial system in
particular.  Analyses of the causes of capital flows typically derive from a macroeconomic
framework based upon basic arbitrage conditions and are linked to key macroeconomic policies,
(see Hanson (1992), Calvo et al.(1993)) for good reviews).  In contrast, several authors have
focused more narrowly on how the financial service provisions of the NAFTA treaty are likely to
effect the degree of competition in the Mexican financial system.  This work has either focused
on the eifficiency of banking services (see Gruben, Welch and Gunther (1993) or Garber and
Weisbrod (1992)) or has attempted to examine the microeconomic implications for the financial
system of capital account opening (see Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993)). Finally, still other
authors have argued (see Vittas et al. (1993) that the NAFTA financial service provisions did
need to provide for a certain period of adjustment for newly privatized Mexican financial groups
to compete with US and Canadian institutions.  This paper tries to partially integrate a number of
these approaches to answer three basic questions:
*  Are there aspects of the NAFTA accord, combined with liberalization of the financial
system, that will fundamentally effect the efficiency of financial service provision and
the size and composition of capital flows to Mexico?
*  How does the NAFTA accord heighten the significance of certain domestic
macroeconomic policies (exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies) and
microeconomic policies relating to the financial system?
D  Given the answers to the first two questions, through which channels will NAFTA
either increase or decrease "systemic risk" in the financial system and/or
"macroeconomic instability"?  In this context,  would a more rapid opening with
respect to the provision of financial services be warranted than is currently planned?
2.  hliis  paper does not examine all parts of the NAFTA treaty, nor does it analyze the many
domestic legislation changes that could have an important bearing on capital flows, (e.g. the
foreign investment law, treatment of intellectual property, tax legislation, the new anti-monopoly
law etc.) in order to address these questions.  Rather, the focus of this paper is on the financial
provisions of the NAFTA accord and their interaction with measures to liberalize the domestic
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helped in the production of this paper.financial system that have been implemented since 1988 to the present.  At the same time, we
examine the interactions between these provisions and certain key macroeconomic policies
(exchange rate and monetary policy).
3.  Section IJ provides a setting for our discussion by reviewing recent macroeconomic
trends in respect to the composition of capital flows.  This section also provides a recent snap-
shot of the factors which helps to explain the very high before tax nominal rates of interest still
observed in Mexico as well as some background regarding the structure and health of the
financial services industry in Mexico.  Finally, it outlines some aspects of the NAFTA financial
services provisions.
4.  Section III examines how the NAFTA accord and, in particular. its financial service and
investment provisions will impact on the level and composition of capital flows.  In addition, it
examines the extent to which efficiency in the provision of financial services will be improved.
It identifies some channels that will promote greater competition and efficiency in financial
services that have not been highlighted in the paper by Gruben et al.(l993).
5.  Section IV argues that certain types of domestic financial policies take on particular
importance in light of the NAFTA provisions at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic
level.  Specific domestic financial and macro policy areas are highlighted here to show how
NAFTA would effect either systemic risk of the financial system or macroeconomic instability.
Some options for changes in these domestic policies to ameliorate these problems are discussed.
6.  Section V summarizes and comments on the implications of the above analysis for a
more rapid opening of the financial services industry in Mexico than called for under NAFTA.
II.  The Setting
7.  The implications of NAFTA for capital flows and efficiency in provision of financial
services must start from an adequate understanding of the economic environment that would be
faced by a prospective investor.  The sections below outline characteristics of the
macroeconomic environment. the size, structure, and composition of capital flows, and some
information in respect to the reasons for the continued high lending rates and their relatively
large dispersion across borrowers of different size.  It also focuses attention on the
microeconomic structure of the Mexican financial conglomerates that provide various types of
financial services and concludes with a discussion of some of the key characteristics of the
NAFTA financial services provisions.
A.  Capital Flows
8.  The magnitude and composition of capital flows into Mexico have not been independent
of the macroeconomic environment (see Sections A. I and A.2 below).  Moreover, the destination
and composition of the flows of capital into Mexico has changed markedly in relation to the early
1980's (see section A.3).4
A. 1. Macroeconomic Background
9.  Economic growth ground to a virtual halt over 1982-87. During this same period there
was a sharp deterioration in living standards, the infrastructure deteriorated, high inflation was
prevalent, and investor confidence was undermined.  Policy makers responded to the inflation
explosion of 1987 (inflation peaked at 159 percent) with an ambitious stabilization program,
known as the "Economic Solidarity Pact" or "Pacto".  Mexico's unprecedented fiscal austerity
program was crucial for the success of the Pacto.  The Pacto, announced in December 1987, was
an agreement between business, labor, and government which called for accelerated structural
reform, fiurther  tightening of fiscal policy, wage controls. and control of basic public and private
sector prices. The cornerstone of the Pacto was a freeze of the nominal exchange rate (ER)
against the US dollar.  Monetary policy was tightened in order to support and sustain the ER
policy.  The Pacto was renewed, with important modifications, by the new Mexican
Administration under the name of "PECE" (Pact for Stabilization and Growth).  Under the PECE
and its successive renewals (the latest one was in October 1993), public tariffs and minimum
wages were revised, contractual wages in the private sector were liberalized in 1989, controlled
prices were revised and most were de facto liberalized in 1990, and a daily adjustment of the
peso ER against the U.S. dollar was introduced (1 old peso a day for most of 1989, 80 cents for
most of 1990, 40 cents for most of 1991). The preannounced daily rate of devaluation was, in
November 1991, replaced by an ER band.  The floor of the ER band remained fixed at the
November 1991 level while the ceiling was depreciated daily, based on a preannounced schedule
(20 old cents for most of 1992, 40 cents in 1993 and 1994).
10.  In the case of almost every macroeconomic target under direct or indirect governmental
control. performance under the PECE (or, interchangeably, Pacto) has been exemplary, in some
instances going far beyond what was originally planned (Table 1). Inflation dropped from 159
percent in 1987 to 19 percent in 1989; it rose temporarily during 1990 (to 30 percent) due to the
price de-control of most private goods. The downward trend was resumed in 1991 and by 1992,
inflation wvas  less than 12 percent; 8 percent inflation is expected for 1993. After virtually
stagnating from 1982-88, output growth averaged 3.5 percent in 1989-92. It peaked in 1990 and
has since declined to 2.6 percent in 1992 reaching almost zero in mid-1993.  Confidence in the
economy, a key factor in the economic recovery, was reflected in sharp declines of the nominal
interest rates and massive private capital inflows.5
Table  I
Basic  Macroeconomic  Indicators
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Money and Finance:
[ntlation%(CPI)  1/  101.9  65.5  57.7  86.2  131.8  114.2  20  26.7  22.7  15.5
Mil Growth Rate 2'  41.4  62.4  53.8  72.1  129.7  58.1  40.7  62.6  119.8  17.3  14.2
Interest Rate (Cetes 28  75.4  62.2  82  135.2  156.4  114.5  56.9  42  21.4  17.1
days. Annual)
BOP - US$
Trade Balance  14105  13184  8398  5020  8787  2610  405  -882  -7279  -15934
ExportsofGNFS  30004  33886  31503  26339  32975  36712  42307  48673  51401  55299  61242
Imports ofGNFS  16216  21028  23741  21805  23894  34146  42426  51535  60508  73617  76394
Current Account  5424  3765  404  -1771  3820  -2922  -6085  -7114  -13780  -22800
Capital Account  339  1306  -316  -2716  -1189  -1163  3176  8164  24134  25955
Fiscal
Primary BaL./GDP  4.8  5.5  3.9  2.6  5.6  8  8.5  7.7  5.3  4.5
Economic Bal./GDP  -8.1  -7.1  -8  -14.5  -14.4  -9.3  -4.8  -2.2  -0.3  1.6  0.7
Oil Price ($/Bar) 4/  28.37  28.25  26.98  13.82  17.79  14.15  17.19  22.05  18.3  19.22
LIBOR  9.7  10.9  8.4  6.9  7.2  8  9.3  8.3  6
Real Sector:
GDP Growth Rate  -4.2  3.6  2.6  -3.8  1.9  1.2  3.3  4.4  3.6  2.8  0.1  I
Mfc. Growth Rate  -7.8  5  6.1  -5.3  3  3.2  7.2  6.1  4  2.3  -1.5
Real Exchange Rate  1.49  1.31  1.28  1.65  1.56  1.34  1.350  1.302  1.189
Consumption.GDP 5,'  69.7  72.3  73.7  77.1  74.6  78  78.8  79.3  80.7  82.9
Investment/GDP 5'  20.8  19.9  21.2  18.3  19.3  20.4  21.4  21.9  22.4  23.2
A.2. The Magnitude of Capital Flows
11.  Associated with these macroeconomic developments was a sharp improvement in
confidence of both Mexico's private sector and foreign investors.  Long-term capital inflows,
including massive capital repatriation, skyrocketed to US$24 billion in 1991, after being negative
(on average) over 1985-88. Capital inflows remained strong in 1992 at US$26 billion, and
during the first half of 1993 at US$16 billion.  Although Mexico's economic rebound can be
traced back to structural reforms which began well before the Pacto, the reform program was
intensified (both in scope and in depth) after the Salinas Administration came into office in late
1988. Among the more important actions have been: the comprehensive commercial foreign
debt restructuring cum-debt reduction reached in 1990; commercial bank privatization over
1991-92; application of most privatization proceeds to domestic debt reduction; NAFTA ratified
in 1993; reform of the land-tenure "ejido" system, and. the central bank autonomy law passed in
December 1993 by an overwhelming congressional majority.  Most of these reforms were
virtually inconceivable in 1988.
12.  With all the successes that Mexico has had in restructuring its economy, regaining access
to foreign capital markets, and in bringing down inflation to single-digit levels, the recent
evolution observed in several macroeconomic indicators are a cause of concern.  The strong
deceleration in economic growth over 1991-92 has coincided with a sharp real peso appreciation
and large trade deficits.  Although trade and current account deficits were over-financed by
private capital inflows, and the real ER appreciation was, in large measure, induced by these
capital inflows, the sustainability of economic growth per se is now in question.  Economic6
growth in 1993 is expected to be close to zero.  Lower domestic and. particularly. private saving
accounted for more than half of the account deterioration in 1988-92. As a result. private
external indebtedness has risen sharplv (albeit from a low base).  Non-bank private debt rose
from approximately US$5 billion in 1989 to almost US$15 billion in September. 1993; and
Mexican commercial banks net external debt increased US$12 billion between 1989 and
September, 1993.
13.  The combination of very slow growth and very large trade and current deficits raises
concerns about the medium-term capacity of Mexico's private sector to service external
liabilities. In view of these concerns. Mexico remains vulnerable to volatile capital inflows in
the short term.  Private saving must eventually improve and. in this process. medium-term
prospects for output growth will brighten.  However, in the short term, the improvement in
private saving (a reduction in consumption) will require a domestic economic contraction.  It is
possible that this is in fact what we began to observe in 1993: a sharp real contraction of private
consumption (in absolute terms) associated with low or even zero economic growth.  The 1993
slowdown has been compounded by a sharp deceleration in private investment due. in part. to
uncertainties related to NAFTA, and in part, to high real interest rates.
A.3 D)estination  and Composition of Capital Flows
14.  The surge in capital inflows has been associated with a large change in the composition
of the sources and destination of those flows. As Table 2-a shows, the bulk of the new flows
financed the private rather than the public sector.  Most of the new flows were direct foreign
investment (DFI) rather than debt-creating flows as was the case in the late 1970's and early
1980's. In turn. the bulk of DFI was portfolio investment.  Portfolio investment rose from 0 in
1988 to US$9.8 billion in 1991, US$13.5 billion in 1992 and US$7.8 billion in the first half of
1993. Among the debt-creating flows, bond issues were the most important.  There were almost
no new syndicated bank loans to Mexico.  Outstanding bond offerings in foreign capital markets
(see subsection B.  1) rose from US$0.6 billion in 1989 (of bonds issued during 1982-89) to
US$19.4 billion in 1993 (of bonds issued during 1982-93).
Table 2-a
MEXICO: Capital Inflows 1989-92
1989  1990  1991  1992
).Total Capital Flows  3,037  8,163  24,133  25,954
2. Total Private Flows  881  5,910  15,807  21,142
Foreign Direct Investment  3,669  4,628  14.632  18,919
Net Direct Investment  3,176  2,633  4,762  5,366
Portfolio Investment  493  1.994  9.870  13,553
Private Non-Guaranteed Debt  (2,788)  1.282  1,175  2,223
(Net)
15.  In view of the growing importance of portfolio flows, it is useful to show as well how the
composition of these flows evolved.  Up until 1991, the bulk of portfolio investment went into
equity (see Table 2-b).  Thereafter, foreign investment in Mexican domestic government paper
gained inmportance,  partly reflecting Mexico's growing fiscal strengths, and partly reflecting the
slowdown in economic growth in 1992-93 (Table 2-c).  By October of 1993 portfolio investment7
by foreigners in government securities amounted to 44 percent of the stock outstanding of all
forms of securities. Portfolio investment in CETES amounted to almost 50 percent of the stock
of such securities.  Finally equity holdings by foreign investors now account for more than 60
percent of the value of shares outstanding which are being transacted.
Table 2-b
Foreign Investment in the Mexican Stock Exchange
Amount Outstanding at Market Value
(Millions of Dollars)
Month  ADR's  Free Subscription  Neutral Fund  Mexico Fund  T'otal
Amount  Shiare  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share
Dec 1989  402.0  49.8  107.0  13.2  35.0  4.3  264.0  32.7  808.0  100.0
Dec 1990  2.086.8  51.2  i.072.7  26.3  676.0  16.6  243.9  6.0  4.079.5  100.0
Dec 1991  13.733.5  74.1  2.961.0  16.0  1.348.8  7.3  499.3  2.7  18.542.5  100.0
Dec 1992  21.154.0  73.8  5.097.0  17.8  1.798.1  6.3  619.01/  2.2  28.668.0  100.0
.Jun 1993  16.202.4  73.3  3.780.1  17.1  1.460.9  6.6  674.4  3.0  22.1 17.7  100.0
Dec  1993  21.154.0  73.8  5.097.0  17.8  1.798.1  6.3  619.01/  2.2  28.668.0  100.0
Annual
Variations
Dec-90/  419.1  902.6  1,831.5  -7.6  404.9
Dec-89
Dec-91!  558.1  176.0  99.5  104.8  354.5
Dec-90
Dec-92/  54.0  72.1  33.3  24.0  54.6
Dec-91
I/ Portfolio value at October  1992.
SOURCE:  Anuario  Bursatil 1992,  Bolsa  Mexicana  de Valores,  January, 1993
Table 2-c
Foreign Investment in Mexican Government Securities
Amount Outstanding at Market Value
(Millions of New Pesos)
D)atc  CETES  PAGAFES  I/  BONDES  TESOBONOS  I/  AJUSTABONOS  TOTAL
Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share
.lan-31-91  4.056.6  4t.1  262.1  2.7  4.634.7  47.0  53.4  0.5  862.2  8.7  9.868.9  100.0
jutn-25-91  6.692.4  45.3  667.8  4 5  4.008.2  27.t  23.8  0 2  3,379.1  22.9  14,771  3  100.0
D)cc-30X-9I  0.075.1  54.0  64.8  0.4  2.231.1  13.3  790.1  4.7  4.641.5  27.6  16.802.7  100.0
Jun-30-Q2  15.039.3  58.4  0.0  0.0  1,695.4  6.6  924.3  3.6  8.078.8  31.4  25.7377  100.0
Dec-30-92  28.539.9  64.3  0.0  0.0  3.856.8  8.7  615.6  1.4  11,355.8  25.6  44.368.1  100.0
Variations
Dcc-91.Jan.-9I  123.7  -75.3  -51.9  1.381.0  438.4  70.3
I)cc-92ADcc-91  314.5  NA.  72.9  -22.1  144.7  164.1
1. For 1'AiAFEs  and TESOBONOS  the average  exchange  rate of'current  month was used.
SOt R('E  Itanco  de Mexico8
B.  Trends in Cost of Offshore Borrowings
16.  Since the signing of the Brady deal for restructuring its foreign commercial debt in 1990.
Mexico has consistently improved the terms of its new borrowings in international capital
markets (subsection B. 1). Quite independentlv from this trend. the terms obtained reflect
increasing differentiation in terms of the risks associated with specific financial institution
borrowers (Subsection B.2).
B. I  Corporate offshore borrowing operations and rates
17.  With the restructuring of its external public debt under the Brady plan, Mexico's access to
international capital markets improved sharply. This was not just reflected in improved access for
both debt and equity issues but also in the terms for the new bonds issued (see Table 3). In 1982-
89, total new bond issues totaled US$1.3 billion, of which US$0.6 billion was issued in 1989 (the
year in vvhich  the Brady plan was launched).  In 1990 alone, new bond issues reached US$3
billion.  This figure was surpassed in 1991, US$3.2 billion, and once again in 1992, with US$4.2
billion.  During 1993, there was another sharp rise of new bond offerings. totaling US$9.8 billion
up through November.
18.  The improved terms of new offerings refers both to lower interest spreads with
comparable maturity instruments (US T.Bills) and longer maturities.  Yield spreads over risk-
free, 5 year public paper have narrowed in the primary market from 820 basis points on
unenhanced paper (i.e., unsecured) which BANCOMEXT launched in June 1989. to around 400
basis poiints  in the second half of 1990 (NAFIN obtained a 424 basis points spread and PEMEX
377 towards the end of 1990). The spread of the 5 year unenhanced public paper over the 5 year
US T.Bill fell to around 250 basis points in late 1991 (PEMEX) and to slightly above 200 basis
points in April 1992 (for maturities of up to 10 years).  There has been some fluctuation since
then: although we don't have spreads for public paper, the spreads of unenhanced private paper
tended to increase for the rest of 1992 (for example, CEMEX obtained a 280 basis points spread
in November 1991, but had to pay a 465 basis points spread in May 1992), suggesting that
something similar may have happened with public paper.  During 1993. yield spreads over risk-
free. 5 year selected public paper evolved as follows: 208 basis points in March (U.M.S.), 215
basis points in July (BANCOMEXT) and 225 basis points in November (NAFIN).
19.  A gradual lengthening of the maturities of new offerings has also been observed.  While
the typical maturity in 1989-90 was 2 to 5 years, more or less frequent issues (mainly public) of
7- 10 year maturity paper appeared in 1991-92. In 1992-93, maturities of 5-10 years also become
accessible to a few private firms including commercial banks.  Another breakthrough took place
in November, 1993 when PEMEX issued a 30 year US$250 million note with a spread of 220
basis over the 30 year US T.Bill.9
Table 3
Terms of Offshore Debt Issues
Issuer  Date  of Issue  Amount  Currencv  Interest  Spread  over  Maturitv
Rate  US T Bill  l
Bancomext  06/01/89  100.000.000  US  Dollars  10.250  820  5
Nafin  08/02/90  100.000.000  US  Dollars  11.750  424  5
Pemex  12/13/90  100,000.000  US  Dollars  11.430  377  5
Pemex  10/08/91  150.000.000  tUS  Dollars  10.250  245  7
Cemex  11/15/91  100.000.000  US Dollars  10.00  280  5
Nafin  06/01/92  100.000.000  US  Dollars  9.375  195  10
Cemex  11/05/92  280.000.000  US  Dollars  10.000  455  7
UMS (UN  Mex St)  03/16/93  200.000.000  US  Dollars  7.250  208  5
Bancomext  07/06/93  200.000.000  US  Dollars  7.5  215  7
Cemex  08/31/93  120.000.000  US  Dollars  8.5  311  7
Nafin  11/10/93  100.000,000  US  Dollars  6.25  225  5
Pemex  11/18/93  250.000.000  [JS  Dollars  8.5  220  30
Source:  Comision  Nacional  de Valores
B.2  Commercial Bank Offshore Borrowing Rates
20.  Besides data on the cost to the Mexican government on borrowing in international
markets and to larger non-financial corporations through ADR and ADS offerings.  it is
interesting to examine the costs of short term borrowing in intemational markets to different
banking groups. This can be done by examining the costs of short-term borrowing rates in the
offshore Euromarkets.  Rates quoted in this market suggest significant tiering across Mexican
commercial banks of different size and capital strength. For example, immediately after
commercial bank privatization, the cost of funding in the Euro-bond market hardly reflected any
dispersion.  The range of rates had widened by as much as 200 to 300 basis points for Mexican
commercial banks of different size by December 1993. This can be seen by examining the
differences in similar maturity zero coupon bond offerings by such banks as seen in Table 4.
These changes reflect investor expectations about the relative solvency and risk of investments in
these institutions.  Such differences have started to become more pronounced as the Government
of Mexico (GOM) increasingly sends the signal that it is prepared to permit commercial banking
groups to take significant losses as witnessed by the 1992 episode with Ajustabonos.' These
trends would suggest that remaining competitive may require that medium and small Mexican
financial groups without extensive branch networks and limited capital strength will increasingly
consolidate with other smaller financial groups.  This is a trend that has already begun. 3
2 In the first quarter  of 1992, the real interest raid paid by the Ajustabonos (inflation indexed public debt) declined
to a record  low of about 2 percent.  Following a series of measures aimed at curbing the growth of the dollar
exposure of commercial banks, as well as a sharp increase in the current account deficit, real interest rates began to
increase.  As a result, many banks that were holding Ajustabonos as part of the liquidity requirement imposed by the
Bank of Mexico, incurred substantial capital losses since their purchases of these bonds were funded with short term
repurchase agreements.  The government suspended new issues of Ajustabonos for the rest of 1992.
At this writing, at least 2 mergers between financial groups are in process.10
Table 4
Offshore Costs of Borrowing by Selected
Mexican Financial Groups *
s  Instrument  I issuer  Date of Issue  Maturity Date  Interest Rate  Amount
lD  Bancomer (London)  15-Sep-93  15-Dec-93  3.7500%  $3.400
i  CD  Banorte  23-Nov-93  21-Feb-94  5.1250%  $4.000
CD  Comermex  03-Dec-93  01-Jun-94  5.1875%  $10.000
CD  Confia  13-Oct-93  11-Jan-94  5.3730%  $0.600
C  D  -Union  (Formerly  08-Oct-93  06-AprO94  3.7500%  $2.600
Bco BCH)  .
* As of December 1993
C.  Economic Factors Beyond Mexico's Control
21.  TUhe  integration of Mexico into the world economy and, particularly, the US economy,
has increased its vulnerability to external and domestic exogenous factors.  It is important to
identify what these factors may be and how thev may evolve over time in order to assess their
potential impact on systemic risk in the financial sector as well as on monetary and exchange rate
policy.
22.  I)uring the next Sexenio, Mexico will find itself under strong pressure to modernize its
political institutions.  While this will lead to greater stability eventually, there is the risk that
during the transition there may be periods of greater macroeconomic policy uncertainty.  The
creation of an autonomous Central Bank will help to diminish these risks.
23.  During the 1  980s and early 1  990s, the business cycles of Mexico and the US do not
appear to have been closely correlated.  However, the ongoing economic integration between
Mexico. Canada and the US under NAFTA will increase Mexico's dependence on US economic
activity and. in particular, US monetary policy.
24.  Mexico will remain vulnerable to the traditional sources of risk -- foreign interest rates
and oil prices.  However, these sources are likely to be less important for several reasons in the
years ahead.  First, about half of Mexico's public foreign debt is set at fixed rates (the Brady par
bonds). Second. a large share of growing private foreign liabilities has taken the form of equity
with foreigners absorbing much of the risk.  Nevertheless, an increase in foreign interest rates
may prompt a reversal of capital flows that were previously driven by low US interest rates.
Mexico has also reduced its dependency on oil revenue: oil exports accounted for less than 20
percent of total exports in 1992, compared to more than two-thirds in the early 1980s. 4
25.  ]Finally.  Mexico will remain vulnerable to investor perceptions that treat the country as "a
new junk bond market".  One of the more interesting reasons for the massive capital inflows into
Mexico has been the drying up of the developed country junk bond market: the implications go
beyond Mexico and apply to all Latin American countries that are receiving large capital inflows
from developed countries.  As Mexico becomes "accepted" on international markets,
4 Part of this shift is due to lower oil prices.11
international investors may reorient portfolios away from Mexico as opportunities to invest in
high-yield securities open up in other parts of the world.
D.  Micro and Macro Factors Affecting the Costs of Capital In Mexico
26.  Although substantial reforms were implemented to the financial svstem involving
extensive deregulation of financial services over the 1988-92 period, nominal and ex-post real
lending rates of interest before and after taxes have remained high.  Chart I plots both the
lending rates by commercial banks and the government cost of funds as reflected in CETES
rates.  It also shows the average cost of funds to commercial banks as measured by CPP.  The
spreads between CPP and Cetes has been widening over the 1989-93 period. 5 This is due to the
fact that the investment grade rating obtained for CETES elicited a strong demand by foreigners.
The growing spread also reflects the fact that the relative solvency of the banking system has
deteriorated slightly since the time of privatization.!
27.  Underlying these high interest rates are both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors.
Looking at these helps to highlight the types of
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channels through which NAFTA provisions could have a beneficial effect on efficiency of
financial intermediation in Mexico.  Although the numbers are not precise, and are based on
average. rather than marginal funding rates to commercial banks, the decomposition in Table 5
gives a sense for the magnitudes involved.'
This  widening  would  also occur if the new average interbank  rate were used (TIIP).
By June 1993, non-performing loans (as a percentage of total loans) had deteriorated to about 7.2 percent versus 5
percent in 1991-92.
7The  approximation  error introduced  by using CPP  rates (i.e a weighted  average  of all rates  quoted  on different
commercial  bank liabilities)  is not that large  to the extent  that all liabilities,  even  checking  accounts,  pay interest.12
28.  The margins starting at the UJS  Treasury Bill (US T Bill) rate are high.  Of course, these
margins will never go to zero given the differences in credit risk across countries. tax treatment,
and in efficiency of financial service provision.  However, by comparing these margins to those
which might reasonably be expected under more favorable macroeconomic conditions, or. given
a more efficient financial system and securities markets, it is possible to highlight where
attention should be placed.
29.  M1,acroeconomic  factors account for 9 percent of the difference between GOM borrowing
rates as measured by CETES and the rate on U.S. treasury bills as of December 1993, when these
calculations were done.  About 1 percent can be attributed to the country risk premium; about 4.5
percent can be attributed to expected inflation (minus expected inflation abroad); and the
remaining 3.5 percent can be attributed to the real exchange rate risk. 8
30.  MAlicroeconomic  factors help to explain an additional 8-25 percent of the margin between
government borrowing rates and rates to large or small and medium enterprises.  This additional
margin can be separated into several components.
31.  First, the 4 percent difference between CETES and CPP can be attributed equally to the
risk of the banks themselves and to taxes that apply to commercial bank liabilities, but not to
government liabilities.  This margin is rather high and could be reduced through a combination
of improved supervision and tax policy changes.
32.  Second, the difference between CPP (the average cost of funds to commercial banks) and
lending rates to large borrowers is about 6-8 percent.  This difference, discussed in more detail in
Annex 1 and in a recent study done by the Mexican Banking Commission, can be attributed
primarily to the cost of bank operations (i.e. administrative and personnel costs account for about
70 percent of gross spreads).  It also reflects implicit taxes such as capital requirements or
deposit insurance quotas to FOBAPROA and provisions on bad loans  i.e. "reservas
preventivas". 9 This spread also  reflects the costs imposed due to nonexistence of markets in
which to manage domestic interest rate risk at low transactions costs (and lack of market
liquidity) that forces greater holdings of reserves for liquidity purposes.'"  Finally, the high
spreads also reflect profit margins.  Annex I provides a more detailed analysis of banking
spreads based on both the work of the authors and the CNB in Mexico.
See  Notes in  Table 5 for an explanation  of this decomposition.
'Commercial  Bank loans are classified  and it should be noted  that having  loans that  are overdue  (Cartera  Vencida)
does not imply  that provisions  have to be held  against  these  assets.
"' Recent  changes in Central  Bank operating  procedures  have eliminated  the need for commercial  banks  to keep
deposits  with  the Central Bank  to effect  clearing  of payments.13
Table 5
Decomposition of the Lending Rate 1,
Macroeconomic  Factors  Percent
1) Base Rate  (US Treasury  Bills) (1 month)  3.0
2) Country  Risk  Premium  .,  1.5
_  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
3) Real  Exchange  Rate  Risk  y,  3.0
4)  Inflation  differential  Risk  ,  4.5
5) GOM  Government  Borrowing  Rate (Cetes  Rate)  (2+3+4)  12.0
Microeconomic  Factors
6) Taxes  applied  to bank  liabilities  vs.  Government  liabilities  2.0
7) Risk of Banks 6/  2.0
8) Average  Cost  of  Funds to Commercial  Banks  (CPP  rate)  (5-t-6+7)  16.0
9) Bank Operating  Costs,  Profit  Margin,  and  Implicit  and  Explicit  Taxes  7  6-10
10) Estimated  average  lending  rate (8+9)  22-26
1 1) Rates to Prime  Borrowers  17-22
12) Rates to SME  Borrowers  27-3
Source: Central  Bank and authors estimates
1/ Assumes the foliowing levels for interest rates: ic (Cetes)=12%: it (Tesobonos)=4.5%: ia(Ajustabonos)=5%:
iTB(US T.Bill)=3%. Tesobonos are dollar-indexed domestic debt instruments, A justabonos are inflation-indexed
domestic debt instruments: Cetes are peso-denominated domestic debt instruments.  We also assumed foreign inflation
of 2.5%.
2/ Equal to: (it - iTB)
3/ Equal to: (ic - it) +  2.5  - (ic - ja)
(foreign inflation)  expected domestic inflation
4/ Equal to: ic - i - 2.5a- To the extent that ajustobonos are of maturity 3-5 years and of longer duration that CETES
(28 days) this approximation is biased downwards because of the liquidity premium inherent in the ajustobonos rate
which is not reflected in the CETES rate.
5/ The exact size of the tax effect is dependent upon whether it is foreigners or domestic residents that purchase
government or commercial bank liabilities as tax treatment differs.  If it is foreigners it is 15% (tax rate applied to
foreigners) of 15% (rate on bank liabilities) or 2.2%: if it is a mix of foreigners and domestic corporations. it would be
(2.2% + 1.4%)/2  = 1.8%.
6/ These rates reflect the risk differential between government and commercial bank liabilities.  The bias introduced by
comparing marginal government borrowing rates to average bank deposit rates is not allowed for but should be borne
in mind.
7' Recent reforms suggest that the most important components of commercial banking spreads are profit margins and
operatina and administrative costs.  Implicit and explicit taxes taking the form of reserve requirements of liquidity
coefficients have been eliminated in local currency.  The exception relates to limitations on dollars denominated
liabilities (no greater than 20%).  15% of which are subject to special investment guidelines relating to liquidity.  This
latter limitation obviously has implications for domestic lending rates as it limits the extent to which banks can pass on
the lower costs of funding abroad to domestic borrowers.  These calculations only consider banks and do not consider
other entities within the financial group where other explicit taxes such as the value added tax of 10% would apply
thereby having implications tbr the pricing of these services or for spreads charged in commercial bank lending
operations as a means of compensating for these taxes.
8/This spread was estimated by comparing the cost of a typical leasing contract (i.e.) where repossession is not a
problem with the terms of credit contracts for small and medium enterprises.  Note that this spread may understate the
effective rates paid by small and medium sized borrowers as they must post collateral to obtain the loan that can
amount to more than the value of the loan contracted.14
33.  Irn  the United States, the difference between government borrowing rates and loans by
commercial banks to prime customers is about 3.5 percent.  This suggests that commercial
bank ing spreads could be reduced by perhaps 3-5 percent.  Measures to achieve this objective
and the possible channels through which the NAFTA accord will create pressures to reduce
commercial banking spreads are discussed further in the sections that follow.
34.  Third. although along a continuum, the range between the lending rates to large
borrowers and the rates to SME borrowers of 22-36 percent  respectively is higher than one
would expect in a more well developed and efficient financial system."  This large continuum
reflects a variety of defects in Mexico's legal and institutional infrastructure that limits secured
lending to SMEs.  Different types of reforms involving modernization of the law of secured
transactions and institutional improvements to Mexico's system of registries will be hastened by
the NAFT?A  accord (see Section IV below).  These types of reforms could remedy some of these
problems and might reduce this continuum of rates by 4-6 percent.
35.  A.n  important proviso associated with the analysis of the microeconomic factors causing
high commercial banking spreads is that such calculations do not take into account the financial
services offered by all entities within a typical Mexican financial group.  This can make the
typical analysis of spreads for commercial banks misleading particularly given the growth and
profitabil.ty of some types of non-banking services (e.g. leasing).
E.  The Structure of the Mexican Financial Services Industry
36.  Any analysis of the effects of the NAFTA financial service provisions cannot proceed
without a careful examination of the rapidly evolving structure of Mexico's financial service
industry (see Table 6 for detail).  In this context, it can be important to understand not only what
is legally required, but also how financial groups operate in practice.  In addition, a number of
important changes have been made in the legal and regulatory framework since the massive set
of changes made over the 1990-92 period.
37.  Newly privatized financial groups in Mexico are rapidly becoming fully diversified
providers of financial services. These groups can provide retail banking services, insurance
services, brokerage services, factoring and leasing services, asset and eventually pension
managemznt services, and investment banking and financial advisory services through the
commercial bank.  These products are cross-sold through branch networks both within Mexico
and offshore.  Moreover, it is important to note that very few of these services are offered
through segmented, separately capitalized subsidiaries.  The preeminence of commercial banks in
terms of total financial system assets can be seen in Table 6 below, which portrays the data
available on the proportion of total financial system assets controlled by each type of entity.  1
2
Usually some of these services are offered both by the commercial bank in the group and by a
subsidiary that can offer the service.  In addition, recent changes in the financial groups law in
1993 perniit the holding to create multiple numbers of subsidiaries of the same type and to cross-
" This range of rates does not even include the capitalized value of collateral (usually taking the form of real estate
equal to as rnuch as three times the value of the loan) that would increase the bands of interest rates between large
and small borrowers.15
sell most financial services out of the offices of any of these entities.  Cross-investments between
subsidiaries are not permitted as a means of preventing pyramiding of capital.
38.  In contrast to many other countries, the financial holding in Mexico (Controladora) is
ultimately liable for the actions of any subsidiaries.'.'  In this way, the structure of Mexican
financial groups is somewhat unique within the context of Latin America.  Unlike multiple
banks. the financial group in Mexico is typically organized under a financial holding (i.e.
Controladora) where the industrial groups may ultimately control this financial holding.  This
occurs despite attempts under the financial groups law to limit "control" by any one industrial
group. 1
4
39.  Chart 2 illustrates a typical structure.  The chart shows that the industrial holding can
have interests in both a financial group and in an insurance company.  Present regulations might
not treat the insurance company in this structure as related to the financial holding and permit
cross-investments by the insurance company into the subsidiaries underneath the financial
holding company.
12Note that this table excludes assets of credit unions a form of auxiliary credit institution that is not
inconsequential.
'  The extent to which liability extends upstream to the industrial holding depends on the authorities knowledge of
the extent of actual shareholdings by the industrial group in the financial holding.
14 This refers to the limitation that each series A shareholder not hold more than 5 percent of the shares which
requires the ability for supervisors to determine the relation between parties.16
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Table 6.
Assets  of the Financial  System  by Type  of Institution  (in billion  Pesos)
1986 (%)  1987  (%)  1988 (°')  1989 (%)  1990 (%)  1991 (%)  1992 (%)
Commercial Banks  33,636  46  78,566  45  105,460  42  155,854  47  238,251  53  367.653  58  398,079  59
Development Banks  33.833  47  85.259  48  99,069  39  109,305  33  103,773  23  116,282  19  136,258  20
Trust Funds  3.347  4.6  7,870  4.5  10,587  4.2  13,445  4  14,408  3.2  18,789  3  21.444  3.2
Brokerage Firms  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a
Insurance Companies  1,938  2.7  4.781  2.7  7.949  3.2  11,107  3.3  14,752  3.3  19,567  3.1  22,993  3.4
Mutual Funds  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  26,273  10  40,222  12  59,744  13  82,079  13  59,836  8.9
FactoringCompanies  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  7,129  1.6  7,009  1.1  11,774  1.7
Leasing Companies  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  2,438  1  3,680  1.1  9,245  2.1  17,224  2.7  23,223  3.4
Warehousing Companies  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  705  0.2  1,077 0.2  1,531 0.2  1,812 0.3
Foreign Exchange Houses  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a
Total  72,754 100  176,476  100  251,776  100 334,318 100  448.379  100  630,134  100 675,419  100o
Sources:  Banco  de Mexico,  CNB.  CNSF,  CNV
Notes: These are  gross assets and do not net out positions among these  entitle
40.  The actual services which can be provided by each entity within the group, as well as by
the commercial bank and holding are summarized in Table 7."5  Note, that while commercial
banks may take equity positions in firms or hold debt of such entities, they do not generally
retain control of non-financial-corporations  and they cannot legally underwrite securities
offerings.  Thus, such institutions cannot be thought of as "Universal Banks" despite the fact that
many securities market transactions and investment banking functions can be carried out in the
commercial bank within the financial conglomerate.  Table 7 below indicates that many entities
within the financial group can issue subordinated debt and can provide services that are close
substitutes to those provided by the commercial bank.
41.  Although this type of financial structure may allow for taking advantage of some
economies of scope (see Ortiz (  )) it also has its disadvantages.  First, this structure may cause
incentive problems if the "true" controlling industrial group experiences financial distress.  In
this case, the "controlling shareholder group" of the industrial enterprise often finds a means of
decapitalizing the financial group as has occurred in other Latin American countries such as
Chile and Colombia in the past.  Second, this type of structure may hinder transparency, not only
to consumers that must purchase a bundle of financial products, but also to the managers of the
financial group.  In this latter case, this structure can make measurement of risk exposures on a
net basis more complex and lead to a greater possibility of management mistakes.
42.  The profitability of banking and, more broadly, financial services (see Annex I for detail)
has elicited interest in entry by domestic financial institutions; this year alone there have been 1  1
rs For a more detailed discussion of the set of services, see Glaessner "Private sector Development and the
Development  of the Mexican  Financial  System" (1992).18
new entrants and 6 applications are still pending.' 6 There will be almost 30 financial groups
operating in Mexico. although each with differing degrees of diversification in respect to the
range of financial services offered, extent of capital backing and overall size.  The capital of the
18 groups now operating i.e of the holding, amounted to $US25 billion as of June 1993 with
about 60 percent accounted for by the three largest groups.' 7
F.  Financial Provisions of NAFTA
43.  The financial provisions of NAFTA have been described in some detail in other work
(see Mansell-Carstens (1993); Gruben et al. (1993); and Bachman (1993).  For the purposes of
this paper, it is particularly important to highlight those provisions that relate to the limitations to
entry of foreign financial institutions, and cross-border financial services.  However, other
aspects of the provisions which deal with such areas as standard of treatment, rule of origin,
transparency, dispute settlement, and reservations are also of importance (See Glossary for
definitions).
44.  MWarket  Access: The NAFTA treaty does limit the access, albeit temporarily, of foreign
financial institutions in such areas as banking, securities, and insurance related services.  Table 8
summarizes some of the most important access limits to the Mexican financial services industry
embodied in the treaty.  Note. that in the case of banking and securities, there are both aggregate
market share and individual market share caps that limit penetration during the phase-in period.
These requirements are stated as a proportion of total capital for each type of entity through
which entry occurs.  In the case of commercial banks the capital (i.e.. net worth) of the
commercial bank or holding will be relevant depending on whether the prospective entrant
establishes a financial group  or only a commercial bank.  In this case, the definition of capital
includes both primary and secondary capital. By contrast in the case of brokerage services the
concept of "global capital" is relevant in determining access limits which is not equivalent to net
worth.  The phase in period in the case of the aggregate market share will be from 1994-1999 and
will be lifted bv the year 2000. It is important to note however, that even these established entry
schedules can be delayed under certain "safeguard" conditions in the treaty that apply to the entry
of banking entities and  securities firms.  Moreover. as shown in Table 8, the protections to the
Mexican payment system  permit Mexican authorities to limit entry once foreign commercial
bank aff,iliates  have a share of aggregate capital of all commercial banks of 25 percent at any
time over the phase-in period.
6 Nine of the new banks, many of which have regional concentrations, include: (I)  Banco Capital S.A. (Grupo
Financiero Capital): (2) Banco de ia Industria, S.A. (40 Investor Group);-(3) Banco Interestatal, S.A.( Union Credito
Interestatal); (4) Banco de Sureste, S.A., (Grupo Financiero Sureste); (5) Banco Inbursa, S.A. (Grupo Financiero
Inbursa); (6) Banco Promotor de Norte, S.A., (Casa de Bolsa Valores Bursatiles); (7) Banco Interacciones S.A.,
(Grupo Financiero Interacciones); (8) Banco Quadrum, S.A., (Grupo Financiero Quadrum); (9) Banco Mitel, S.A.,
(Grupo Financiero Mitel).
"  Moreover, in the case of most of these financial groups, at least 40-50% of the value of this capital reflected
goodwill i.e. "credito mercantil".19
TABLE 7
TYPES OF SERVICES AND  LIABILITIES BY TYPE OF FINANCIAL  ENTITY
(Preliminary  and Under Revision)
TY'PE  SERVICES  LIABILITIES
i lolding  - Administration Agency for other holdings  - Equities (A.B.C.L)
iComipanm  - Subordinated Debt
(Controladora)  - ADR/ADS
Commercial Bank  - Retaii  Services:  - Equities
- Credit  Cards  - Subordinated  Debt
- Mortgage Lending  - Ordinary debt instruments
- Corporate Services:  - Money market instruments inclusive of different forms of deposits
- Corporate Lending  (in local currency)
- Financial Advisory:  - Extent of dollar deposits limited as a percent of total value of
- Merchant/Banking  (Project Finance)  liabilities
- Trust  Services:
- Asset  Management
- Managcment of Investment Funds
(mutual funds)
-Foreign 'Trading for omsn  account
-Own investments in equity and debt
instruments and RPs
Brokcrage F  irms  - Trading for account of clients  -cannot issue deposits
- Trading for own account  -borrowing from local and foreign financial institutions
- Management of investment funds  -issuance of debt (subordinated)  and equity
(mutual funds)
- underwriting
-Can engage in RPs
Exchiangc  House  - Exchange foreign currencies (subject to
Central Bank position limits)  -cannot issue deposits
\W  arehouse  - Storage and sale of goods and  -cannot issue deposits
merchandise for own account  - Storage Certificate (for merchandise in deposit, transit or both)
- Transport of goods and merchandise  - Obtain loans and credit from foreign or local credit institutions.
- Transform goods and merchandises with the  insurance and bonding companies
purpose to increase their value  - Subordinated debt
- certifv quality of goods stored  - Credit instruments in series or mass
- Pack, bottle and label goods and  - Discount documents
merchandise  - Issues Guarantees
- Buy and sell goods and merchandise on  - Negotiate credit instruments and to affect credit rights
behalf of customers
Icasilo  - Credit for members  - cannot issue deposits
- Negotiate the contract or administration of  - Loan and credits from members. providers, credit institutions.
members' properties  insurance and foreign or local bonding companies  - Subordinated
- Promote the organization and administration  debt
of commercial or industrial enterprises  - Credit instruments in series or mass
- Buy. rent or sell goods. merchandise or other  - Discount operations
items from members or third parties
- Acquire share obligations and other
instruments and niaintain them in its portfolio
I:actoring  - factoring contract  -cannot issue deposits
- Administration and collection of credit rights  - L.oan  and credits from credit institutions, insurance and foreign or
local financial institutions
- Subordinated  debt
- Credit instruments in series or mass
- Discount  operations
MIutual  Fund  - Invest client money  - Equities or quotas
- Operate with securities and instruments
authorized by CNV20
45.  In addition. the application of "national treatment" implies that minimum capital for entry
must be irn  accordance with Mexican regulations.  For new commercial banks seeking entry this
requirement is about US$20 million. Recent entrants have established initial capital levels of
US$40 million (see Gruben et al.(1993)).  For securities firms, minimum capital requirements are
US$  10 million.  Finally, in the case of insurance services. entry can occur either through the
establishrnent of operations or equity participation.  As a practical matter, the presence of
foreign entities in the insurance sector is already quite large even if only as minority
shareholders. for the moment.
Table 8
COUNTRY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS UNDER NAFTA IN THE CASE OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES: FORMS OF LIMITATIONS TO ENTRY INTO MEXICO
Type of Service  Aggregate Market Share 18 Individual
Initial Limit  Final Limit  Market Share Caps'9
1. Bankcing  8%  ]  15%  1.5%
2. Securities 20 10%  20%  4.0%
3. Insurance 2'  (see footnote 22)
4. Factoring and Leasing  10%  20%  None
5. Finance Companies  3%  3%23  None
6. Other Financial Service and  None  none  None
Companies 24
7.  Payment  Svstem Protections  25%:5  NA  NA
Scurce:  The  NAFTA  agreement.  Annex 1401.6
i  Stated as percent of total capital for foreign and domestic entities given the relevant definition for the service in
question.  The numerator in the ratio applies to capital of all foreign entities taken together.  Limits are increased by
equal increments annually, over the 7 year phase in period.
'"  Stated as a percent of total capital where this concept differs across banking, securities, insurance, non-bank
banks. (e.eg. finance companies).
2()  The NAFTA agreement does provide for possible entry (2 years after the agreement goes into force) of limited
scope securities firms, whose powers would be limited relative to existing Casas de Bolsas.
21  Applies to Casualty, Life and Health Insurance companies.
'2  The aggregate market share limits for foreign insurance companies wishing to provide services are 6%, 8%, 9%,
10%, 1  1% and  12% respectively between January 1, 1994 to January  1, 1999.  As an alternative, foreign entities
may enter the Mexican Insurance Market in an entirely different manner - involving a phased in equity interest in a
new or existing Mexican Insurance Company.  In this case, the Mexican equity interest in the company cannot be
less than the following percentages over the 6 year phase in period.  There are 70%, 65%, 60%, 55%, 49%, and 25%
that go into effect as of January  I, in each year.
2'  The condition on finance companies or non-bank banks is stated as a percentage of the sum of all aggregate assets
of commercial banks plus aggregate assets of all types of so-called limited scope financial institutions. These
limited scope financial institutions may be established in Mexico to provide "separately" consumer lending,
commercial lending, mortgage lending, or credit and services on terms no less favorable than those applied to
Mexican domestic firms. These limits exclude lending by foreign affiliates of auto-manufacturing companies with
respect to sales of their vehicles.
24 Includes bonding services, warehousing services, investment management services, and foreign exchange related
services (i.e. casa de cambios).
25 This part of the treaty specifies the limit as the capital of foreign commercial bank affiliate as a percent of the
aggregate capital of all commercial banks in Mexico.  If the percentage exceeds the threshold, Mexico can request
consultations to limit entry and reduce "adverse" effects. Adverse effects can be associated with threat of control of
domestic payments by foreign institutions or effects on independence of Mexican monetary and exchange rate
policy.21
46.  In the area of banking services offered by non-bank banks, special limited scope financial
institutions can be established.  These companies cannot bundle together financial services and
can only  provide consumer lending, commercial lending, mortgage lending, or credit services
"separately".  Enforcing this restriction may well be difficult in practice.
47.  Finally. the treaty provides for the immediate provision of bonding, warehousing,
investment management. and foreign exchange related services by foreign institutions with no
entry limitations to Mexico.
48.  Cross Border Financial Services:  Although cross border provision of certain financial
services has occurred in the past, NAFTA calls for the mobility of consumers of financial
services. Although countries do have to permit consumers to access financial services offered by
providers  -- regardless of country of origin -- this does not permit solicitation.  Each country can
define "solicitation".
49.  Another area of importance is the stand-still provisions which do not permnit  a NAFTA
countrv to introduce new provisions which would limit cross-border provision of financial
services.
50.  Other Provisions: Among the most important other provisions (see Glossary for
definitions and Bachman (1993) for detail) are the transparency, dispute settlement, and
reservations and exclusion provisions.  The transparency provisions require all NAFTA countries
to solicit comments and give advance notice in respect to changes in law or regulations relating
to financial services. The dispute settlement provisions define a set of steps involving arbitration
if needed to settle disputes. 26 Finally, the reservations and exclusion provisions protect the right
of NAFTA countries to take actions inconsistent with the agreement if they threaten safety and
soundness of the financial system or the pursuit of monetary and exchange rate policy.
Questions arise here as to how to ascertain when such reservations will be legitimate.
III.  How Will NAFTA affect Efficiency of Financial Service Provision and Capital Flows?
51.  Given the setting laid out in the previous section, how will NAFTA most likely affect the
efficiency with which financial services will be provided and the flows of capital more broadly?
To address these types of questions, this section examines a number of channels through which
NAFTA will affect behavior of financial service entities and capital flows.  Obviously, these
considerations are not independent of each other; a solvent and efficient financial system will
create greater incentives for flows of capital to Mexico.
52.  NAFTA will have important implications for capital flows to Mexico and for the
efficiency of its financial sector.  First, by reducing "reversibility" of policies and by making
policies more predictable. it will increase capital flows (Section III.A).  Second, by fostering
competition and, more broadly, contestability. it will cause a far more rapid process of financial
integration than has currently been assumed, with important implications for capital flows
(Section III.B).  Third, it will create stronger incentives for the rapid upgrading of supervision by
2' The exact mechanism  for dispute  settlement  and the role of technical  experts  in cases of disputes  relating  to
financial  services  still had to be further  defined  in implementing  legislation.22
Mexican agencies (Section III.C).  Finally, it will have significant effects over time on the quality
of information available to market participants for the purposes of self-regulation (Section IIL.D).
A.  Reduced Reversibility of Policies and Predictability
53.  NAFTA will consolidate Mexico's structural reform program by generally making it less
reversible and by increasing the predictability of policies.  Irreversibility stems from the
difficulties involved in undoing what was agreed in NAFTA, e.g., restoring tariffs.  In turn,
increased,  predictability is likely to result from the economic pressures that increased economic
interdependence will put on many other policy areas which need not (and often) are not an
explicit part of NAFTA. e.g., streamlining regulatory procedures, law enforcement, etc.  By
reducing the risk of a policy reversal, and by encouraging policy harmonization and
predictability. Mexico will be able to attract far more foreign capital and investment.  The
following policv areas are likely to become more predictable and less reversible under NAFTA:
54.  Trade  policy: The reimposition of a tariff or quota eliminated under NAFTA will face
opposition not just in Mexico but also, through the different mechanisms of conflict resolution,
from interested foreign parties.  As specific policies agreed under NAFTA are tied to each other,
it will no longer be possible to change a piece of the puzzle without changing the rest.
Articulating new coalitions of interests to dominate coalitions of affected parties will become an
increasingly complex and difficult task.  NAFTA will also create incentives for its members to
homogenize their external tariff with third countries, i.e., it will encourage policy harmonization.
If, for example. Mexico's tariffs for capital good imports from Japan were twice the US level, it
could affect adversely the location of a new firm in Mexico.
55.  Fiscal policy: The growing financial integration of Mexico to the US and Canadian
economr will increase Mexico's vulnerability to changes in the perception of its macroeconomic
situation.  This implies. among other things, growing penalties for possible departures from
stable fiscal paths.  While NAFTA does not entail formal commitments to specific tax polices,
tax arbitrage will penalize those policies that depart from tax harmonization. 27 On the
expenditure side, the establishment of government procurement procedures under NAFTA will
exert a permanent external pressure on the government to abide by procurement regulations
agreed with the other NAFTA countries.  This too has favorable implications for fiscal discipline.
56.  Financial Sector Policies: NAFTA will also have very important implications for the
irreversibility of financial policies.  For example, the most favored nation clauses and national
treatment provisions of the treaty, coupled with the transparency provisions that require advance
notice tc interested persons to comment on domestic financial legislation and the provisions for
settlement of disputes, can limit the extent of reversibility.  Perhaps, more importantly, the
provisions relating to market access and to cross-border provision of services (see Section III.B
below) have been designed in a way that try to limit "back-tracking" on domestic financial sector
27 Mexico has already gone a long way during the  1980s in modernizing, simplifying and improving the
administration of its tax system.  For a good treatment of some outstanding tax issues that Mexico will need to
address as a result of the enactment of NAFTA, see the work of Gordon, R. in Musalem et al. (1993).23
policies."  A good example is the so-called "stand-still" obligation relating to cross-border
provision of financial services.  This provision would not permit NAFTA countries to introduce
"ne  " measures restricting cross-border sales or consumption of financial services.
57.  The collective effectiveness of the above provisions will depend criticallv upon the
monitoring capability of the parties of the agreement.  In this context, the provisions that specifv
penalties for non-observance and the reservations and exclusion clauses are critical.
Reservations or exclusions to provisions within the treaty may be obtained for (i) prudential
reasons; (ii) in pursuit of monetary or credit policies; and (iii) subject to conditions relating to
exchange rate policies.  These clauses could appear to give Mexico fairly wide latitude to reverse
policies if such conditions are broadly interpreted.  However, it must be remembered that the
large dependence of Mexico on foreign non-debt creating capital flows would limit the degree to
which Mexico will want to employ these clauses.
58.  Legal Reform and Judicial Process:  Many legal procedures and processes which are not
an explicit part of NAFTA, will have to be streamlined. Mexican law enforcement will have to
improve, and several critical laws may have to be harmonized; delays or departures from this
trend will slow down the pace of investment and modernization of Mexico. NAFTA will make
the need for these changes more obvious and could alter the political economy incentives to
favor tlleir implementation.  Eventually, these changes could turn out to be more important than
NAFTA per se.
59.  _<or  example. increasing pressure will exist to further modernize the legal framework
rel  :w to the corporate sector in such areas as bankruptcy, law of negotiable instruments, and
the  wx  relating to secured transactions.  There is significant evidence that the present legal
frai-'ewrrk and the forms of self-regulated monopolies supported (e.g. notaries or receivers), as
wei  is ->lated  problems in many forms of registries, substantially increase transactions costs and
Ihinc  -<  -owth and investment.:  NAFTA will place increasing pressure to break such
mol op,  ies that are in part supported by that subset of the legal profession that currently profits
from the present legal framework.
60.  1'roperty Rights and Confiscation:  A very critical concern for foreign investors in all
countries relates to confiscation and the degree to which different forms of property rights are
preserved in their equity or other forms of investments in business enterprises.  This is important
whether in respect to the claim on the flows of revenue from investments or in respect to
definition of intellectual property.  The NAFTA treaty will act to provide more certainty in
respect to these rights through several channels.  First, the treaty tries to limit the events under
which expropriation of investments could occur and spells out the conditions under which
"  For example  the treaty specifies  that a NAFTA  country  cannot adopt any new measures  restricting  cross-border
financial  services  that are permitted  by that  NAFTA  country  on the date the treaty enters  into force.
-')  There  is a need  to radically  improve  Mexico's  many registries  that serve as a key source  of information  to
financial  market  participants. As of now, Mexico's  registries  relating  to land,  real property,  vehicles,  commercial
registries,  warehouse  registries,  etc. do not functions  particularly  well. Moreover,  notaries,  (Notarios)  and receivers
(sindico)  are legally  mandated  monopolies  that greatly  increase  the costs  and hinder  efficiency  of undertaking
secured  transactions  or bankruptcy  proceedings  respectively.  For example,  problems  with  the registries,  combined
with  the notary  system,  result in  extremely  high costs  to lenders  to perfect  security  interests  in collateral. For
example  the costs of perfecting  a security  interest  in a mortgage  can be 6% of the value  of the loan  extended.24
investors would be compensated (i.e. according to the "fair" market value).-` Second, policies for
review of acquisitions of companies inclusive of financial service companies will be simplified
and made more automatic.  Third, payment transfers and remittances of profits. dividends, and
other payments will be free and subject to choice of currency by the investor.
B.  Financial Integration, Competition. and Efficiencv
61.  The means through which the NAFTA accord will increase contestabilitv and efficiency
of provision of financial services can be divided into three distinct channels: (i) improvements in
the efficiency and quality of financial services provided; (ii) foreign investment in entities
providing such services in Mexico; and (iii) cross-border provision of financial services.
62.  Efficiency and Quality of Financial Services: The success of NAFTA can ultimately be
measured by the modernization of Mexico.  During Mexico's unilateral opening of its trade in the
1  980s. MAexico's  manufacturing sector was increasingly exposed to foreign competition and
modernization.  Therefore, the more dramatic implications of NAFTA are more likely to be
observed in the service sectors and in agriculture (although the opening of some markets for
manufacturing products in both Mexico and the US will also have important implications for the
modernization of manufacturing as well).  Mexico's modernization needs in agriculture and in
services is huge as measured by price differentials between Mexican and US; e.g., until recently,
maize prices in Mexico were about 80 percent above the international price (price guarantees
were replaced by an income support scheme in late 1993). Cargo transportation costs in Mexico
are 2 to 3 times the US level.  Financial margins of intermediation are about 2 times the size of
those in the US in the case of commercial banking spreads (See Annex 1) and transactions costs
associated with underwriting securities issues are also 2-3 times greater in Mexico. NAFTA will
foster the need to modernize these sectors and, along with it, the need for greater financial
resources.  This, in turn, will require a more efficient financial system.
63.  Foreign Entry in Provision of Financial Services:  A number of authors have noted that
NAFTA 's access limitations, although temporary, combined with "securities or capital market
illiquidity" that forces great emphasis on relationship banking will greatly limit competition to
Mexican commercial banks.  This point is highlighted in the case of retail banking services (see
Gruben et al.(1993), and Garber and Weisbrod (1992)).  Moreover, it is correctly argued by
Gruben et al. (1993) that minimum capital regulations which apply in Mexico to establish a bank
(US$20 million) or securities firms (US$10 million) may be far more binding constraints to entry
than the NAFTA access limits. 3'  Finally, the individual share caps of 1.5 percent for banks or 4
percent for securities firms insure that the largest Mexican financial groups cannot be acquired
by foreigners over the phase in period. 32
The accounting  principles  used to determine  "fair market  value"  would  not be inconsequential.  This  is because
differences  exist between  Mexican.  U.S., and Canadian  generally  accepted  accounting  principles.
As in the case of commercial  banks  the level  of this minimum  capital requirement  will discourage  entry  by small
and sometimes  efficient  U.S.  or Canadian  securities  firms. Similar  issues exist  in the case  of smaller  Texas border
banks  (see  Gruben  et al. (1993)).
32 After the phase  in period  ends at the beginning  of the year 2000 no such limitations  will be in force  and a market
for control  will provide  another  dimension  of economic  discipline  for Mexican  financial  conglomerates.25
64.  However. despite the apparent impediments to this form of financial integration implied
by the NAFTA treaty. such arguments neglect to examine how entry into certain non-banking
service areas may break down this segmentation.  The tollowing three examples are illustrative.
65.  First. consider the case of warehousing services which will be liberalized immediately.
New legal provisions introduced in 1993, as noted above, permit warehouses to finance
depositors of goods and merchandise by offering loans collateralized by these products.
Warehouses are also permitted to obtain loans and credits from national or foreign credit
institutions or insurance companies or to issue subordinated debt instruments.  Under these
conditions, one would have to ask how different a set of financial services a multi-national grain
trading company will offer in relation to a typical "non-bank bank" that is subject to access
limits.  Such institutions will compete with commercial banks for agro-industrial accounts and
accounts of more wealthy agricultural producers.
66.  Second. the freedom to offer investment management. advisory services, underwriting
services and mutual fund products, will begin to imply competition for commercial banks even in
areas like retail banking services.  This will occur as the foreign investment management
company solicits business from its clients for its offshore retail banking unit.  Also if the
transactions costs of offering these services are below that entailed in processing bank loans
corporate borrowers may increasingly seek to issue securities and avail themselves of foreign
financial services to place these securities in local Mexican or offshore markets.  To remain
competitive Mexican financial groups will have to offer a bundle of services (based on their
overall correspondent relationship) that is appropriately priced to entice borrowers to remain with
the group.  This will improve the efficiency with which retail banking services are provided.
Similar considerations would apply to non-bank banks since the number of such institutions that
will operate in Mexico may well be large enough as to call into question the ability of Mexican
regulatory authorities to ensure that these institutions are "limited" in scope.
67.  Third, foreign entry in combination with certain domestic policy reforms described in
Section IV. can also act to reduce the problems of "illiquidity" in Mexico's securities markets.
This can occur through the affects of NAFTA on the supply or demand for private securities.
The supply of securities will be increased by the presence of entities such as foreign non-bank
banks (e.g. GE capital) , warehouses etc. that will fund some portion of their local operations
through securities issues in Mexico's private securities markets. 33 In addition, the desire of
Mexican firms to remain competitive, and expand into US or Canadian markets. given NAFTA's
trade provisions, will increasingly require that they finance themselves directly in Mexico's debt
and equity markets as opposed to only utilizing retained earnings or bank debt. 34 It should also
be recognized that the implications of NAFTA for improving the quality of information about
firms (see Section II.D  below) will also be critical in increasing the extent of initial public
offerings of debt or equity in the Mexican markets.  The demand for private securities offerings
will continue to be stimulated by direct foreign portfolio investment that may increasingly move
beyond CETES to rated securities issued by Mexican firms locally.  Here the role of foreign26
"investmLent  management" companies that will not face entry restrictions under NAFTA will be
highly irmportant.
68.  Finally, perhaps as important as the above considerations is the fact that the access limits
under NAFTA outlined in Table 8 above may not be binding in respect to entry. 35 It has been
argued by negotiators of the treaty that the limits were set with the idea that they would not be
binding.  This would imply that competition will be much fiercer under this dimension of
integration than usually thought. In this context the experiences of Argentina. Spain, and Canada
were examined by Negotiators.  This argument needs to be more carefully examined empirically
than has thus far been the case. 36
69.  Cross Border Provision of Financial Services: Under NAFTA, the provision of cross
border financial services will be permnitted.  However. provision of such services cannot be
solicited from consumers in a different country than that of the provider.  Economically,
legalizing the provision of cross-border services without the solicitation restriction would
constitute an important source of competition and contestability in the financial service sector.3
This would be true regardless of the market access limitations relating to certain services as
discussed above.
70.  For example, in the case of securities brokerage services, dematerialization of securities
and advainces  in telecommunications may make it possible for brokerage services to increasingly
be provided via foreign offshore brokerage firms.  In this context, the market-access limitations
might have the effect of creating incentives for a foreign brokerage firm to solicit business for its
offshore operations through its limited scope financial services entity or brokerage house
permitted under the NAFTA treaty.
71.  Flowever, the extent to which this potential can be realized in areas where market access
is limited (e.g. banking. securities, and insurance services) will also depend on both the
definition of "solicitation" and the power or desire of the Mexican Government to enforce actions
in such cases.  It would seem unlikely that enforcement capacity will be sufficient to hinder
These  entities  will  not  be legally  allowed  to undertake  domestic  funding  operations  through  issuance  of deposits
in part  to ensure  that  the  Government  safety  net  is not  further  extended  beyond  its  current  width. See  section  IV  that
discusses  the  importance  of  better  defining  the  extent  of the  Mexican  Government  safety  net.
S'  signs  of this are  already  occurring  as the  real  growth  in commercial  paper  issues  (from  an admittedly  low  level)
was  50  percent  in 1993.
5 The authors  wish  to thank Patricia  Armendariz  for pointing  this out.
An interesting  exercise  would  be to examine  the  contestability  of the  Mexican  banking  system  through  application
of the  methodology  of Sheffrin  (1  99)
I  In view  of  possibly  more  expensive  financial  services  now  provided  in Mexico,  the  provision  of cross-border
services  could  have  an adverse  impact  on Mexico's  current  account  deficit  with  implications  for  the  management  of
Mexico's  rnacroeconomic  policy.27
foreign providers of financial services from soliciting through whatever distribution network of
offices is developed to offer investment management. brokerage. or even certain forms of retail
banking services given the eventual growth of electronic banking products. 38
72.  In this section we have argued that NAFTA is going to foster efficiency through
competition.  Increased efficiency, however, is also going to stem from increased pressures on
the authorities to improve supervision and reduce regulatory competition.
C.  Supervision and Regulatory Competition
73.  The NAFTA accord has significant implications for the incentives of supervisory
agencies and regulatory competition in Mexico, the United States, and Canada.  As suggested in
Musalem et al.( 1993), the NAFTA treaty will require more coordination between supervisory
authorities and increased sharing of information.  In addition. it will start to reduce incentives for
regulatory competition across countries.  It will foster greater harmonization of prudential
regulations in important areas such as capital adequacy, valuation and regulatory accounting
principles, related party transactions, and conflict of interest provisions. etc.  At the same time,
NAFTA will heighten the need to undertake critical reforms in the areas of prudential regulation
that are enforceable. 39
74.  The NAFTA accord will also have very important implications for how financial
regulations are formulated in Mexico through the transparency provisions.  Specifically, the
requirement to solicit comments from interested parties (within and outside Mexico) when
issuing new legislation and regulation, will change the often informal and sometimes unilateral
process used to formulate financial legislation and regulation that has at times existed in Mexico.
Opening up this process will increase the credibility of the legal and regulatory framework
through wider acceptance by those subject to the regulatory standards imposed.
75.  In a more specific sense. NAFTA will force the Mexican Government to rapidly upgrade
supervision and accounting processes to permit supervision to at least the level of the financial
holding.  This will be precipitated by the provisions of the treaty that call for regulatory agencies
to act on applications within a period of 120 days from time of reception.  Thus, once the treaty
is in effect, the US and Canadian regulators will be forced to act on Mexican commercial bank
applications to establish a presence in the United States and in Canada.  In this context, approval
will require that Mexican authorities demonstrate that they have the capability to undertake
adequate supervision. 40
Arguments  of this type can be taken too far and it is certainly  the case that there are some  forms  of financial
services  that will tend  to require  more  of a local  presence  than others. This would  still  hold in the case  of many
tvpes of consumer  banking  services  but would  be less  important  in  the provision  of certain  forms  of insurance  or
pension  fund management  services  etc.  depending  upon the relative  sophistication  of the consumers  of such
services.
'9 See  Section  IV. A. that examines  how lack of change in such regulations  could potentially  increase  systemic  risks
for the Mexican  financial  system.
"'  It could be argued  that such incentives  have  already  existed to the extent  that U.S.  regulators  can deny
applications  if they do not find evidence  of proper  supervision  procedures  for the Bank  in question. This is the case28
76.  Pressure will also be created under NAFTA for Mexico to move to a far more modern
approach to supervision rapidly.  One example is the legal requirement in Mexico that requires
each commission to "define" how entities are to set up their general ledger (Catalago de
Cuentas). inclusive of sub-accounts.  In Mexico inspectors must verify that accounts are prepared
as specified.  Financial institutions in the US and Canada are subject to regulatory reporting
requirements and certain regulatory accounting principles, but regulatorv agencies do not
interfere with how financial institutions define their general ledgers.  As NAFTA permits entry
by foreign entities and as Mexican GAAP and auditing standards improve -- as has already been
occurring -- such legal restrictions will not be necessary.  Additionally,  the implied costs to
Mexican financial institutions of keeping different ledgers for risk measurement purposes  and to
foreign entrants will create great pressure for the Mexican government to modernize its approach
to supervi  sion.
77.  NAFTA will also create fewer incentives for regulatory arbitrage or competition and the
not-insignificant dead-weight loss to society that can result.  Such pressures will manifest
themselves through greater provision of cross-border financial services. As cross-border trade in
financial services expands and regulatory arbitrage opportunities become more evident and
costlv. authorities will have incentives to promote greater harmonization in prudential
regulations. 4'  Moreover, the form and extent of information provided by supervisory agencies in
Mexico relative to the United States and Canada may become somewhat more homogeneous.
78.  In sum, improved supervision, coupled with less regulatory competition will increase
operational efficiency and, thus, lessen systemic risks and increase the interest of foreign
investors in Mexico.  Relatedly, better supervision of financial conglomerates will permit quicker
exit of marginally insolvent institutions, thereby increasing overall efficiency and competition.
D. NAFTA, Self-Regulation, and Information Disclosure
79.  A last channel through which NAFTA will act to increase overall efficiency of the
financial system is by creating incentives for self-regulation and improved quality of information
for both providers and consumers of financial services.
80.  Typically, the implications for competitiveness of Mexico's financial system implied by
NAFTA, focuses on the prospects for greater entry of financial entities.  However, insufficient
attention has been placed on the effects of NAFTA on the quality of information about borrowers
or intermediaries that will be available to both final consumers of financial services and market
participants i.e. providers.  The degree to which self-regulatorv organizations actually self-police
and monitor the activities of different financial entities -- as opposed to restricting entry as a
result of NAFTA -- is also of great importance.  Higher quality and timely information about
final borrowers and intermediaries can reduce the costs of financial intermediation and will
increase ihe confidence of foreign investors.  In addition, such information will facilitate
improvecd  external supervision and better self-regulation by entities such as rating agencies or
auditors etc.
under  the Floreign  Bank Supervision  act that  enables  U.S.  regulatory  authorities  to de-register  foreign  agencies  or
branches  il there is evidence  of inadequate  supervision.
41 Similar  arguments  of course apply  to tax arbitrage  and incentives  to harmonize  structure  of taxation.29
81.  NAFTA will create pressures for improvement in the quality of information available
about both borrowers ( from banks or through public offerings) and about financial
conglomerates themselves through several channels.
82.  First. the entry of foreign institutions into the brokerage and underwriting business in
Mexico, coupled with the expanded presence of international rating agencies and accounting
firms that will have their reputation at stake. will be very important.  Entry of these entities will,
in effect, create much stronger incentives for locally owned brokerage firms to take
responsibilities relating to "due diligence" seriously.  This is because entry of foreign brokerage
firms will force a raising of the standards in which accounts or financial statements are prepared
and assets valued . These effects will filter down to small and medium enterprises to the extent
that these companies eventually list on Mexico's second tier market for equities and debt
offerings.
83.  Second. NAFTA will improve the information regarding commercial bank relationships
with borrowers.  This will occur when it is realized that domestic legislation changes in Mexico
created entities akin to credit bureaus.  Foreign entry into provision of such services as credit
scoring will greatly improve the operation of Mexico's credit markets and the quality of
portfolios and solvency. 42
84.  Third, permitting entry to foreign investment advisors, if properly supervised and
registered, will also have significant effects upon the information available to consumers of
financial services.
85.  Finally. NAFTA will also create incentives for improvements in self-regulation by such
entities as the Bolsa de Valores, OTC participants, Clearing and Custody organizations (e.g.
CECOBAN or INDEVAL), rating agencies, auditors. appraisers (valuers), the Mexican Bar
association and even the self-regulating agency inspecting warehouses (Almacenes Generales de
Depositos).  The pressure to upgrade these organizations and set more objective standards for
entry will occur as foreign entities increasingly enter these service areas.  For example. US
accounting firms and rating agencies as well as technical specialists in such areas as appraisals or
actuarial sciences see massive opportunities emerging for the provision of these services in
Mexico.  Demanders of these services will include the financial conglomerates themselves as
well as end-users of these services such as corporations and households.
IV. How does NAFTA Heighten the Importance of Certain Domestic Macroeconomic and
Microeconomic Policies?
86.  While NAFTA is likely to result in greater capital inflows and a more efficient system of
financial intermediation, it also heightens the importance of making critical changes in certain
domestic policies.  Of particular importance are changes in certain financial policies, at a
microeconomic level and in the exchange rate and monetary policy at a macroeconomic level.
This section argues that lack of a concerted effort to give attention to this set of domestic policies
4'2 The rather  high  prorportion  of credit card  obligations  not repaid  have been  the result of the lack  of information
sharing by Mexican  banks.30
and their complex interrelationships could increase systemic risk for the financial system and,
potentially create macro-economic instability.
A.  Financial Policies
87.  If greater financial integration is not to compromise macroeconomic stability or create
greater systemic risk. careful attention needs to be given to a set of highly inter-related domestic
financial policies and towards improving supervision. 43 The changes in these domestic financial
policies needs to take careful account of the increasingly complex structure of financial/industrial
groups (see Section [I above) and of the expansion that has taken place in Mexico in banking
powers.  If well designed and "enforceable" such policy changes can greatly mitigate the risks
that can be associated wvith  greater financial integration. 44
A. 1. Design of Prudential Regulations
88.  The NAFTA accord will heighten the need to completely revamp the prudential
regulations now in place in Mexico that apply to financial groups, or even self-regulatory
organizatbons such as exchanges or Custody and Clearing Corporations as noted in section III. C.
Extremely important changes need to be undertaken quickly in these areas or the entry of foreign
entities coupled with lack of adequate capacity to measure and manage risk in relation to capital
will heighten systemic risk.  This is because current concepts of capital as well as techniques for
valuation are asymmetric across types of institutions and in respect to like assets. These
inconsistencies can create dis-incentives for adoption of better risk measurement and control
systems by Mexican financial groups.  For example, under current capital guidelines for capital
the Basle guidelines apply to commercial banks. Capital charges for equity holdings by a Bank
are much laxer than that applied to the brokerage firms where "haircuts" (deductions form full
market value) are undertaken if the shares traded are not liquid.  This may partly explain the
movement of equity trading form the brokerage firms to the commercial banks within financial
groups.
89.  The complex financial structures of financial/ industrial conglomerates noted in Section II
complicates Government or private monitoring of such institutions.  Thus, it makes it more
important that prudential regulations in the area of capital, and valuation procedures be
redesigned.
4  A detailed  discussion  of the issues involved  in upgrading  Mexico's  supervision  of financial  groups  -- now  divided
between  three  different  commissions  -- lies beyond  the scope of this paper. Extensive  work is being undertaken  by
the Bank  and IMF  to support  Mexican  efforts in  this area.
4  It is important  to recognize  that any evaluation  of existing  financial  policies  must rest upon specific  criteria. The
work  of Levine  (1993),  Merton  (1993),  Glaessner  and Mas (1992)  and Glaessner  (1993)  suggests  several  criteria
with  which  to assess  financial  policies. These include  how financial  sector reforms  affect:  (a) financial  institution  or
market  monitoring  of non-financial  firms; (b) private  and public  sector monitoring  of financial  intermediaries;  (c)
the possibility  of contagion  and systemic  risk;  (d) the degree of contestability  implied  by the policy  for provision  of
the financial  service  in question;  and (e) the spectrum  of financial  arrangements.  The analysis  below  does  not
undertake  this form of detailed  review,  but is based  upon preliminary  work in this area applied  to Mexico  by
Glaessner  and Levine.31
90.  In the area of valuation the most important changes will involve the need to employ a
consistent methodology for valuing assets of the same types across all forms of entities within
Mexican financial groups.  In this context it Nill be particularly important to mark assets to
market values where possible.  Besides facilitating accounting consolidation for supervision
purposes or financial analysis of groups by rating agencies. defining such standards coupled with
rigorous enforcement can go a long way towards reducing incentives for undertaking illegal
practices among related parties within a financial conglomerate.  For example. during the
ajustobonus crisis of 1992 a number of Mexican financial conglomerates that were sustaining
losses on their own-account positions in ajustobonus sold off-their positions at non-market
values to their customers via sales to own-managed mutual funds. 45 If the commercial bank had
been forced to undertake these transactions at market values it would have had to have shown a
loss in its sale of the securities to the affiliated mutual fund it managed.
91.  In the area of capital adequacy the structure of financial conglomerates makes it
important to make efforts to adjust commercial bank capital for certain market risks associated
with their trading portfolios.  Among the most important sources of such risk are exchange rate
and interest rate risk.  Determination of the capital charges to use as well as the means of
measuring the consolidated exposure of the bank (i.e. netting procedures) inclusive of its foreign
agencies and branches is an area where improvements must be made in the near term.  In
addition, capital regulations for brokerage firms do not presently link risks of positions in all
types of securities with capital (with the exception of equities) even via some form of net-capital
rule as is now used in the United States or United Kingdom.  This is aside from issues of how to
define capital adequacy standards for Mexican securities subsidiaries that would be consistent
with the market risk capital charges defined for Mexican commercial banks in the future. 46
92.  These market risk adjustments only apply to the trading portfolios of Mexican financial
institutions.  The adjustments do not address overall interest rate risks (IRR) being run by
Mexican Banks since no account is taken of the very large lending portfolios at these institutions.
However, in this area there would seem to be real questions whether Mexican authorities would
want to actually force Mexican financial conglomerates to hold additional capital if certain
measures of (IRR) were at a certain level.  Since issues of this type are still under discussion in
various fora, it would seem essential that Mexican prudential regulations do no more than require
financial conglomerates to prepare reports showing IRR under some well defined and agreed
upon rules (for netting positions and accounting for "diversification"). 47
93.  Finally prudential regulations relating to conflicts of interest and information disclosure
will also be in need of revision given the many forms of financial services inclusive of
4  Note that  aside form  the valuation  problems  in related  transactions  the assignment  of transactions  for own account
and third parties  (e.g. the segregation  of accounts  when  acting as a principal  and agent)  is also in need of reform.
The technical  term for this type of transaction  would  be "dumping"  of securities.
4'  Here  the problems  in reaching  agreement  (see the Basle  Committee  proposal  for Market  Risk)  among regulatory
authorities  in the United  States has  hindered  development  of a uniform  approach. Bv contrast  the capital  adequacy
directive  defined  by the EC advocates  application  of the same procedures  for determining  capital  charges  for market
risks,  in the case  of commercial  banks  and brokerage  houses.
47 Current  proposals  issued  as of September  1993  by a U.S.  interagency  task force  suggest  that  even the
measurement  of IRR is in need of more  thought  before  being adopted  in Mexico  or the United  States.32
investment banking services that can be provided through the commercial banks.  However,
reforms iin  this area are not as pressing as refoms  in the aforementioned areas. 48
94.  Reforms in these areas will be hastened by NAFTA to the extent pressures are created for
the harmonization of key prudential regulations in all the above mentioned areas.  Section C
above highlights this point.
A.2. Redefinition of the Safetv Net
95.  I'he recent set of legislative reforms adopted in Mexico during 1993 began to redefine the
nature of.  the safety net provided to financial groups.  Changes were not only made in the Central
Bank's role as LLR, through greater independence, (see section C below).  In addition, two newly
defined special insurance funds were created for insurance of commercial bank deposits
(FOBAF'ROA) and to provide coverage against losses suffered by investors operating through
Mexican brokerage firms (FAGMV) respectively.
96.  These funds were set up as special trusts administered by the Central Bank49where the
Ministry of Finance is charged with defining the ordinary and extraordinary contributions to be
made by either Banks or Brokerage firms to either of these funds under consultation with the
Central Bank. 50 The liability of each Fund (and Government) is not limited to a given subset of
depositors or investors.  Instead it is left to the Central Bank in consultation with the technical
committee to determine the type and amount of deposits to be covered or extent of coverage to
provide to investors.  Moreover, quotas for the banks are the same regardless of their capital and
portfolio risk while in the case of brokerage firms contributions are linked to the number of
transactions undertaken on behalf of clients.  Finally, in the event that the Central Bank extends
resources to a commercial bank or brokerage firm the advances made are collateralized with
stock of the troubled bank or other forms of acceptable collateral.  This last provision thereby
tries to ensure that shareholders are not made whole in resolving banking crises.
97.  The current Insurance fund arrangements although an improvement over earlier
approachles  still suffer from a variety of well-known drawbacks.  First, by not linking ex-post
loss sharing formulas to the risks undertaken both the free rider and moral hazard problem can
arise.  In the case of the free -rider problem the tiering in the euro-CD market highlighted in
section ]I. B. of this paper between the largest and smaller banks would suggest that these
problems could be significant.  Moreover, recent work by Alejandro Diaz de Leon Carillo (1993)
based on the use of options pricing theory demonstrates that optimal risk adjusted deposit
insurance premia would range from 4.97 % of deposits in the cases of Atlantico, Mercantil and
Serfin to .82 and .70 in the cases of Bancomer and Banamex respectively.  In the case of the
moral hazard problem there will be a tendency for commercial banks with weak capital positions
4  Efforts  to develop  privately  managed  defined  contribution  schemes  under  the SAR will make  it necessary  to take
a variety  of actions  in this area.
4" The Central Bank  actually  has a fiduciary  liability  to contributors  (e.g.  the commercial  banks or brokerage  firms).
i"  Normal  contributions  in the case of the commercial  bank quotas  paid to the fund are 3 Nuevos  Pesos  per 1000
Nuevos  Pesos  of liabilities. Also  the determination  of the quotas  also involves  an assessment  made  by a technical
committee  that includes  representatives  from the Commissions  as well as the Central  Bank and Ministry  of Finance.33
to lend to riskier clients and to not perform their monitoring function in respect to borrowers.
Second, the fact that these insurance funds do not explicitly indicate what size of investor or
depositor is covered may reduce incentives for the private monitoring of the financial
intermediary or brokerage firm by large investors or depositors.'
98.  A final area where a more explicit definition of rights and obligations may be needed is in
the process for resolving bank failures.  No well defined set of regulations and law govern the
process for bank re-organization and liquidation.  It would appear that an actual liquidation
would have to fall under the auspices of a receiver under Mexico's bankruptcy law that is in need
of modernization.  The process is not legally defined to be "extra-judicial" as is the case in many
countries.  Moreover, the processes used and the degree to which the Central Bank and the
Ministry of Finance ensure that equity holders take losses need to be made more explicit.  In the
absence of such reforms, disincentives can actually be created for different bank claimants (e.g.
bondholders. equity holders and depositors) to avert financial problems by pressuring
management.--
99.  Such findings would tend to heighten the need for a revision to valuation and capital
regulations and a strengthening of external supervision in order to offset these free-rider and
moral hazard problems. This would be aside from some changes in current design of the Funds
to more explicitly define the nature of the Government liability.  The NAFTA provisions as
argued in section III. C. will act to hasten implementation of these reforms.
A.3.  Policies to Increase Liquidity of Domestic Securities Markets
100.  Asset price volatility and systemic risk could rise under increased financial integration
unless the liquidity of domestic securities markets is improved.  This lack of liquidity could
become more important given the duration mismatches that some financial institutions are
starting to take regarding domestic interest rates.  To improve liquidity of domestic securities
markets requires actions to increase both the demand and supply of "private" securities in
Mexico.  In addition, it will require certain actions that will permit well capitalized
intermediaries to make a market in such securities or to use them as collateral in repurchase
agreements.
101.  To increase the supply of securities offered more effort needs to be focused on the
reasons why firms of all sizes have not gone to the capital markets more directly through initial
public offerings.  Many firms have favored financing through retained earnings or commercial
bank finance vs. issuance of commercial paper (see Garber and Weisbrod (1991)).  However,
these trends appear to be changing as commercial paper offerings by both non-financial
companies and financial groups increased by 50 percent in real terms in 1993. Moreover, data
available from the Mexican Securities Exchange Commission (CNV) suggests that as many as
1000 new small and medium size firms may become eligible to list on Mexico's new second-tier
stock exchange.  However, in this latter case only six small to medium sized firms have listed on
See Levine  (I1993)  or Glaessner  and Mas  (1992) that also  makes  this point.
See Glaessner and Mas (1992) for Latin American experience and examples of how the banking law and
regulations can be designed to create incentives for quick resolution of financial crises, through more effective
private and government monitoring of financial intermediaries.34
the exchange.  In part this may be due to the fact that development banks continue to play a very
important role in extending direct credit or financial guarantees to small and medium sized firms
(the liabilities of development banks grew by 50% in real terms in 1993).'3 Similarly, the public
policy issues relating to increasing the supply of securities through various forms of asset
securitization (as is already underway in the case of credit card and trade receivables) also need
to be studied. 54
(a)  Legal and regulatory reforms to clearly define the rights of the different parties to
such transactions.  For example, the types of institutions that could act as
sponsors. issuers, servicers, and trustees must be defined along with information
disclosure requirements and the rights and obligations of these different parties.
Permitting these different functions to be separated in the Mexican context could
be problematic if it weakens incentives for the institution originating the asset not
to undertake adequate credit analysis and monitor borrowers to insure repayment;
(  b)  The institutional infrastructure needed to support the safe insurance of these forms
of securities needs further development.  This would include information about
the issuer and histories relating to the assets (e.g. default histories and pre-
payment information on mortgage loans, payment history on receivables, etc.)
further development of local rating agencies, development of appraisal companies
and title insurance in the case of securitization of mortgage loans;
(c)  Complicated accounting and tax treatment issues would have to be investigated
that relate to the resale or assignment of the original assets and securities.
Likewise. the incentives created for the use of such transactions by financial
group will also depend upon how they would be treated in the context of
prudential regulations relating to capital adequacy; and
(d)  The issue of the government role in credit enhancement through offering
guarantees of different types needs examination.  In addition, the setting up of a
wholly private secondary mortgage bank to provide liquidity in this market would
need to be examined.
102.  In order to increase the demand for securities, Mexico will be required to develop larger
sources of longer term private savings and "institutional investors".  As noted, the insurance
sector is very small in Mexico and actions to reform Mexico's Old Age Security and Health
systems could have significant implications for the development of new insurance products (e.g.
annuities, disability coverage etc.).  There is a need to re-evaluate the extent and types of
coverage now provided by the Mexican social security institute (IMSS).  Introduction of the
compu?lsory  privately managed defined contribution scheme (SAR), with $U.S. 3 billion
currently invested in Government securities by the Central Bank, coupled with the rapid
i3  Important issues arise as to how development banks in Mexico can play a more effective role in assisting rather
than retarding the development of the second-tier market for equity issues by small and medium enterprises.
54 As discussed in Glaessner (1992) in more detail, reforms in four related areas would have to be implemented to
ensure thiat  securitization of certain forms of domestic assets does not increase systemic risk and the possible need
for government bailouts.  Areas where reforms would be needed would include:35
development of Mexico's voluntary occupational pension plans (with US$7 billion of assets
under management) will also increase the demand for longer term securities offerings.
103.  Finally, aside from actions to increase the supply and demand for securities. actions can
be taken to improve liquidity of the existing set of private securities traded by permitting
repurchase agreements to be undertaken where private securities (subject to certain ratings
criteria) can serve as eligible collateral.  This could improve the liquidity of private securities
issued by non-financial corporations and increase the attractiveness to corporations of direct
placement of commercial paper or other forms of debt issues in domestic markets vis a vis
commercial bank borrowing.  However, it is important to note that there could be good reasons to
not permit the Mexican Central Bank from participating in such transactions. 55
A.4.  Introduction of Derivative Instruments
104.  As noted by Mathieson and Rojas Suarez (1993), the opening of the capital account and
the financial service industry can be accompanied by increased volatility in asset prices.  There is
no doubt that the volatility of asset prices in Mexico has tended to exceed that of the US and
Canada.
105.  The development of standardized forms of derivative instruments subject to proper self-
regulatory and supervision safeguards could provide a means for private agents to share these
risks at low transactions costs.' 6 However, without adequate risk safeguards in place
(particularly on the stock exchange or OTC market or sufficiently well developed financial
infrastructure in such areas as clearing of high volume payments) introduction of these financial
innovations can actually increase volatility of asset prices given the leverage that transacting in
such contracts can permit.57
106.  More generally, the legal system in Mexico has made it difficult to develop derivative
instruments.  For example, the legal concept of novation (which permits an organization like an
exchange to assume the contract of the seller on behalf of the buyer) does not appear to be
defined in Mexico. This implies that modern clearing arTangements involving the establishment
of a clearing corporation that would stand between counterparts to securities trades is not used.
Instead, over-the-counter markets have been used for derivative instruments.  A central, separate
clearing corporation where clearing members would be require to hold larger capital positions
than those trading derivative contracts on the floor of the exchange would have advantages for
both regulators and market participants.
; For example.  the Central  Bank  would  be faced  with  the prospect  of having  to choose  across  the paper of different
financial  groups  to both  purchaseisell  or repurchase. This  could have a destabilizing  effect if economic  agents
viewed  this as signalling  the relative  solvency  of different  financial  institutions.
Mexico  already  permits  trading  of exchange  traded  warrants  on equities and forward  contracts  in peso/dollars  (out
to I year)  through  over-the  counter  transactions. Moreover,  offshore  exchanges  are used  to hedge commodity  price
risks  (e.g.  oil). However,  no domestic  interest  rate derivative  contracts  trade either  on the Mexican  stock exchange
or OTC.
i- One example  would  be to ensure  that delivery  versus payment  is possible in OTC  securities  transactions. At
present  this does not appear  to be the case notwithstanding  the electronic  payments  system  (SIAC)  that is now in
place in  the Bank  of Mexico.36
107.  This organizational structure could permit better management and control of risks than in
an OTC environment.'8 In addition, it could better facilitate information sharing across
exchanges in NAFTA countries.  This is because in Canada and the United States Clearing
corporations play a significant role in trading of derivative contracts and in existing arrangements
for information sharing in implementing risk safeguards in trading of like derivative instruments.
If Mexico develops a similar institutional structure for the trading of derivative instruments it
would permit arrangements now applied in the U.S. and Canada to be applied to cross-border
positions in like derivative contracts undertaken in Mexico.
A.6.  NAFTA and Constraints on Foreign Borrowing by Commercial Banks
108.  In August 1991 the Central Bank imposed reserve requirements on foreign currency
deposits of foreign branches of Mexican commercial banks.  The purpose of these reserve
requirements was to limit the explosively growing dollar exposure of Mexican commercial
banks.  Due to the ineffectiveness of these requirements5' a ceiling was placed on dollar
borrowing as a percentage of total liabilities valued in pesos.  Originally, this ceiling was 10
percent with reserve requirements applied to such borrowings of 15 percent that could be held in
"liquid" clollar  denominated deposits.  In November 1992, the 10 percent foreign currency-peso
liability ratio was raised to 20 percent.  Of the extra 10 percent allowed, 4 percent had to be
loaned to exporters or importers of capital goods. and the other 6 percent was temporary (until
February 1996, after which time it will have to be gradually cancelled in a period of two years).
The impact on foreign borrowing of the November announcement was very limited in view of
the fact that most of the large banks were holding foreign currency-peso liability ratios of more
than 20 percent.  However, this did help some banks to expand their foreign borrowing.
109.  Although this measure was not meant as a macroeconomic policy measure, it helped the
central bank to curb short-term capital inflows without the fiscal (quasi-fiscal) costs associated
with sterilization.  Sterilization is costly as the interest paid on domestic obligations issued/sold
far exceeds the interest perceived on the foreign assets that the central bank holds.  This has been
reflected in reduced profits of the central bank. particularly, during 1991.60
110.  Despite the possible advantages that controls on foreign bank borrowing may have (e.g.,
avoidance of costs of sterilization), growing pressure against such controls is likely to evolve
under NAFTA.  Increased foreign participation in Mexico's financial system under NAFTA
could make some of these regulations contradict the spirit of NAFTA, e.g., as foreign banks are
likely to be more heavily funded abroad.  Nevertheless, the dollar exposures of Mexican banks
will have to be watched.
;g  There  are obvious  trade-offs  here in that over-the-counter-  transactions  force  risk management  to be borne  by
counterparts  themselves.  On the other hand, clearing  corporations  can be set up in ways  so that different  forms  of
risks  can be adequately  managed. See Parkinson  et al. (1992)  or Glaessner  (1993) for a discussion  of issues in  this
area in Latin  America.
The imposition  of foreign  deposit  reserve  requirements  in 1991  did not prove effective  in reducing  foreign
borrowing  of commercial  banks. Commercial  banks  side-stepped  the foreign  currency  reserve  requirement  by using
the US T. Bills  (held  as reserve  requirements)  as collateral  to increase  their foreign  borrowing.
""  The reason  for this lies in  the fact that peso-denominated  Mexican  assets  and US dollar/Canadian  dollar
denominated  assets  are not viewed  as perfect  substitutes.  This requires  Mexican  authorities  to pay higher  yields in
sterilizing  capital  inflows.37
111.  The key issues here are really supervision and prudential regulation. For example. no
arbitrary liability ceiling may need to be imposed on foreign borrowing.  However. a bank mav
have to have its liabilities hedged with assets of a similar currency and maturity or be subject to
capital adequacv regulations that account for market risks inclusive of exchange rate risks on the
balance sheet (see Section IV.A.2 above).  In addition the quality of dollar assets must be
checked (i.e. credit risk which is dependent on exchange rate risk in part must be monitored).
This will in turn require the existence of credit bureaus that will be hastened under NAFTA (see
section III. D above).
B.  Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy
112.  In November 1991. along with the Pacto renewal, Mexico liberalized foreign exchange
transactions and implemented an exchange rate band.  The floor of the band was left fixed at the
November 1991 level while the ceiling of the band was depreciated at 20 cents a day.  In the
October 1992 Pacto renewal. the government stepped up the rate of depreciation of the ceiling of
the exchange rate band from 20 cents a day to 40 cents a day while the floor of the band
remained fixed.  Under the October 1993 Pacto renewal, the floor of the ER band remained fixed
and the ceiling continued to be depreciated 40 cents a day.  By the end of 1994, the ER band will
have a width of approximatelv +±-  7 percent with respect to the (implicit) central parity.
1  13.  The main role of monetary policy has been to support fiscal policy and exchange rate
policy to achieve major disinflation in the Mexican economy, while, at the same time, help
maintain marked inflows of foreign capital to Mexico.  Monetary policy in Mexico is intimately
related to exchange rate policy.  Namely, once the parameters of the exchange rate band are
chosen (based mainly on the official inflation target), there is a limited range of interest rates that
is consistent and compatible with these parameters.  A key role of monetary policy is to provide
conditions for the emergence of such interest rates, while, at the same time, ensuring that the
growth of monetary aggregates (particularly, currency in circulation, since the demand for other
forms of money is strongly demand-driven) is consistent with the inflation target.
114.  Despite the increased flexibility permitted by the exchange rate band, the actual exchange
rate has remained virtually unchanged between the 1992 Pacto renewal (except for the short-
lived speculative attack on the peso in the week that preceded the NAFTA vote in the US
Congress) and the NAFTA ratification by the US Congress in November 1993. This was the
result of the fact that the central bank had an inner band of intramarginal intervention of about
I/-  1 percent which was flat. After the NAFTA ratification, the inner band was substantially
relaxed: its initial width was increased to +/- 3 percent and, while the floor remained fixed, the
ceiling was depreciated at the same rate as the ceiling of the official (wider) band, i.e., 40 cents a
day.
115.  The current policy of widening the exchange rate band and increasing the flexibility of
the exchange rate within the band will enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.  This policy
acquires special significance in the context of growing financial interdependence which the
globalization of Mexico's capital markets is leading to, particularly, under NAFTA.  Foreigners
already hold around half of domestic government paper and about two-thirds of the stock market
capitalization (as measured by the paper which is actively traded).  The increased margin of38
flexibility in the exchange rate can help to prevent speculative pressures while retaining an
exchange rate regime that is not completely a free float. while avoiding potential capital losses
induced by forex intervention, given a fixed exchange rate regime or very narrow bands.
116.  T'he case for a wider exchange rate band can also be made on the basis of a once and for
all portfolio adjustment.  Capital inflows attracted by Mexico's modernization needs will require
more downward exchange rate flexibility in order to accommodate (in a non-inflationary
manner) potentially larger capital inflows.  However, as capital inflows slow down, a more
depreciated real exchange rate will be needed.  A period of large capital inflows is likely to be
followed by a period where larger trade surpluses are required to service the new debt and to
remit dividends on the new equity held by foreigners, thus, requiring a more depreciated real
exchange rate in the future.  The need for an eventual peso depreciation. e.g., if the productivity
response to reform is not commensurate with the availability of foreign financing resources, may
also stem,  from the dismantling of tariffs under NAFTA (only partially offset by the dismantling
of lower US tariffs). 6"
117.  The November 8th, 1993 attack on the peso, in part induced by the uncertainties
surrounding the NAFTA ratification process in the US Congress, shows that having a wide
exchange rate band and occasionally using it (to absorb a shock that requires a peso depreciation)
needs not lead to a permanent peso depreciation.  A wide exchange rate band can still fulfill a
very useful role in the presence of attacks to the currency.  In principle, the authorities could have
relied only on interest rates, or could have suspended the exchange rate band and let the market
forces produce a much larger devaluation.  In our view, the reaction by the authorities increased
the credilbility  of exchange rate policy, in that it dealt satisfactorily with the events.
118.  From the microeconomic point of view, the increased exchange rate flexibility implies
higher exchange rate uncertainty.  This may be desirable in its own right insofar as it will
discourage speculative short-term capital inflows.  Regardless, firms can resort to hedging
options such as the forward market of foreign exchange which is now open to all firms and
individuals and where maturities have been lengthened to I year. 62
119.  Another implication of having increased exchange rate flexibility is that it is likely to be
associated with reduced interest rate volatility, e.g., for a given central bank forex reserve target,
a shock that leads to higher capital outtlows (inflows) will be absorbed in part by a higher
(lower) exchange rate and not just by higher (lower) interest rates.  For many banks, this could be
important as most Mexican banks are likely to be more exposed to interest rate volatility than to
exchange rate volatility (at least at current levels of dollar exposure).
120.  Finally, the issue of making the exchange rate more flexible cannot be separated from the
realities of the planned integration with the US in the framework of NAFTA.  For the reasons
given above, the globalization of Mexico's capital and financial markets. it appears that the
increased exchange rate flexibility is desirable at least during the transitional phase of the
hl  The need for a peso depreciation  would,  of course,  also  be affected  by the evolution  of differential  productivity
growth;  note that Mexico's  productivity  is likely  to grow faster than  the US's (due  to a catch  up effect)  (See  Oks et
al. (I1993)  which examines issues relating to productivity growth in more detail.)
62 In addition, an informal dollar-peso swapmarket with maturities beyond a year is also beginning.39
integration to the US and Canada.  The issue of whether in the long run Mexico may benefit from
a fixed exchange rate is a different one.
121.  Economic integration under NAFTA is likely to increase the proportion of financial
transactions which are denominated in US dollars. In this context, having a credible fixed
exchange rate or, more extremely, a currencv union, may yield efficiencv gains as it reduces
transaction costs including the cost of hedging due to uncertain exchange rates. On the other
hand. fixing the exchange rate will reduce the effectiveness of Mexico's monetary policy (a
currency union will totally eliminate it).  Preserving an independent monetary policy may be
valuable in view of the large asymmetries between the US and Mexico. e.g., Mexico is an oil
exporter and the US an oil importer which implies that each country will benefit from being able
to respond to an oil shock with different monetary policies.  This asymmetry could be offset if
there was fiscal cooperation between the two countries; something which right now appears to be
far away.  In fact, in the area of fiscal policy there is another big asymmetry: at least over recent
years. Mexico had a much tighter fiscal policy than the US.  If this situation continues, in the end
Mexico may end up having high interest rates (under a fixed exchange rate) due to lack of fiscal
adjustment in the US.  Other conditions which may have to be met to justify a fixed exchange
rate/currency union are: achieve inflation convergence; and consolidate advances in the areas of
factor mobility and wage flexibility.  In particular, labor mobility between Mexico and the US
may have to be permitted, something which NAFTA has deliberately kept aside (in spite of all
the illegal emigration to the US).  It is possible that for the gains to offset the costs,
improvements in several areas will have to be achieved first (fiscal cooperation. inflation
convergence. factor mobility, and wage flexibility).
D.  The Central Bank and Lender of Last Resort
122.  Will the central bank role of lender of last resort be affected by NAFTA? By permitting
foreign financial institutions to participate in Mexico, NAFTA can potentially reduce the
likelihood that it will be called to intervene as lender of last resort.  This will be the case to the
extent that mainly solid foreign financial institutions enter into the Mexican market and if
emphasis is placed on implementing the package of reforms to domestic financial policies
outlined in Section IV.A. above.  The participation of solid foreign financial institutions can
reduce the need for central bank intervention in several ways: by raising the standards of credit
risk evaluation and of risk management in general through proper provisioning, etc.; and by
potentially increasing the amount of capital beyond what is technically required (under the
current BIS regulations) as international institutions will have an incentive to preserve their
international reputation.
123.  In order to attract the more solid foreign institutions and screen less than solid financial
institutions the regulatory and supervisory framework will need to be improved rapidly.
Otherwise, there is the risk that the role of the central bank as lender of last resort will increase
rather than decline.40
V.  Conclusions
124.  T  here are clear benefits of opening Mexico's financial sector to foreign competition more
rapidly.  As we discussed in Section III. this would result in faster improvements in efficiency.
lower margins of intermediation, and even larger capital flows during the transition phase
currently planned.  At the same time.  we have also pointed out that even under the present
access limits and reservations available under the NAFTA treaty, competition in many areas of
financial services (even in retail banking) may be much more fierce than is currently believed.
Examining the issue of opening Mexico's financial sector to foreign competition more rapidly
raises two broad categories of tradeoffs.
A. Possible macro-destabilizing effects of NAFTA
125.  A faster opening of the capital and services account could lead to further increases in the
size of capital inflows.  Insofar as these inflows go to finance investment that help to modernize
Mexico's economy, these capital inflows should present no problem.  However, there is the risk
that, as i.n 1989-92, much of these inflows could be associated with lower domestic and, in
particular, private savings. 63 This could have destabilizing macroeconomic effects.  Further
declines in private saving could seriously compromise the sustainability of Mexico's medium-
term economic growth, as (in this case) Mexico will be acquiring foreign obligations while not
expanding its productive base, and could even affect adversely short-term growth, if a new round
of real peso appreciation results.  The latter could occur if capital inflows are too strong, inflation
convergence is compromised and firms that are already facing strong competitive pressures are
no longer able to compete.  This, in turn, could lead to a deterioration of the quality of bank's
portfolios with implications for systemic risks in the financial system.
126.  NAFTA will also raise fiscal pressures for Mexico quite independently of the speed with
which it opens (what remains to be opened of) its capital and services accounts.  The need to
upgrade human skills and physical infrastructure to be able to compete under NAFTA will mean
increased need for raising public investment.  Similarly, the opening of the labor intensive
agricultural sectors to foreign competition will have important fiscal implications as the needs to
create a social safety net for displaced workers increase.  These factors imply that, at the margin,
the additional strain on the fiscal situation that systemic risks in Mexico's financial system may
produce may be potentially important.
B.  Systemic risks.
127.  Introduction of foreign competition at an extremely fast pace could force some domestic
financial institutions into bankruptcy possibly complicating public finances and the stability of
the financial system.  Moreover, it could precipitate capital flight and increased volatility in
domestic asset prices. At the same time the restructuring required within the non-financial
corporate sector and the implications for industrial groups of this process could also worsen the
financial condition of financial intermediaries.
In other words the capital inflows would be used to augment consumption.41
128.  To lessen systemic risk as Mexico's financial sector and real sectors are opened to
competition will require a consistent set of structural microeconomic reforms that will have to be
carefully sequenced. These will have to include:
(a)  concerted efforts to rapidly improve supervision of financial conglomerates.  This
action would need to be coupled with passage of more modern accounting.
valuation and capital regulations that force financial groups to adopt a higher
minimum standard in respect to systems for measuring and managing different
forms of risk.  Actions to quickly assess the quality of bank portfolios would also
be essential in addition to improvements in processes for bank failure resolution
and in the system of deposit insurance.
(b)  changes to the legal and regulatory framework to increasingly create greater
incentives for true self-policing by a broad set of self-regulatory associations as
defined above.  This could greatly enhance the quality of information and its
analysis through development of better practices by auditors, accountants,
actuaries, appraisers, financial analysts or rating agencies etc.  This would. in turn.
create greater prospects for development of much greater volumes of initial public
offering by companies (See part (iv) below).  Simultaneously, objective standards
for entry into such organizations should be developed that can be monitored by
supervisory agencies.
(c)  changes in the legal and regulatory framework in respect to secured transactions
or bankruptcy and in judicial processes that will broaden the set of borrowers that
can access formal credit markets and reduce costs of bankruptcy or
reorganization.  These efforts will also improve the base of information on all
borrowers and the degree of security in different forms of collateral, if coupled
with actions too improve and automate the public registries inclusive of
commercial and civil registries.
(d)  actions to increase the liquidity of the private securities markets by increasing
both the supply and demand for securities.  To do this will require a set of
consistent reforms in such areas as social security (inclusive of old age security
and health) or insurance which will result in a greater demand for securities
through development of a broader class of institutional investors to complement
existing Mexican "mutual funds".  At the same time non-financial corporations
will need to be subject to enough competition to begin to feel the need to raise
capital through public debt or equity offerings, rather than employ retained
earnings or bank borrowing.  Finally, brokerage firms and banks could be
permitted to engage in repurchase agreements with private securities as collateral.
for reasons examined in Section IV.A above.
(e)  when the cash markets are more well developed and liquid and when supervision
and self-regulatory processes have been substantially improved it will become
important to introduce a greater variety of derivative instruments.  Similar
arguments can be made in the case of asset-backed securities denominated in local
currency for the reasons noted above.42
129.  In sum. it is important to note that Mexico is progressing rapidly to implement structural
reforms in areas (i - v) that will result in adequate financial sector infrastructure to support
greater financial market integration under NAFTA.  Thus, the prospect for permitting greater
foreign participation in provision of financial services in Mexico than programmed under
NAFTA may well become a reality.43
Glossary
Terms in Respect to the NAFTA Treaty 64
Described below is each of the major principles and standards used in the NAFTA treaty.
Sltandard of treatment.  Generally, each NAFTA country must grant "national
treatment" and "most-favored-nation" treatment to providers of and investors in financial
services from other NAFTA countries.  "National treatment" means treatment no less favorable
than a NAFTA country accords to its own domestic financial institutions and investors, or their
investments, in like circumstances.  "Most-favored-nation" treatment means treatment no less
favorable than a NAFTA country accords to financial institutions and investors from any
NAFTA or non-NAFTA country, or their investments, in like circumstances.
NMarket  Access.  The Agreement requires each NAFTA country to permit individuals and
companies from the other NAFTA countries to provide financial services in its territory and to
expand throughout its territory, either through separate subsidiaries or direct branches across
international boundaries.  Each NAFTA country may decide to restrict such access to
subsidiaries rather than direct branches.  Negotiations to permit direct bank branching across
NAFTA country borders will take place if and when the United States allows interstate branching
for banks within the United States.  In Mexico, access for certain types of financial institutions
(e.g., banks, securities firms, insurance companiesj  from other NAFTA countries will be subject
to market share limitations that will be phased out during a six-year transition period.  Mexico
has also agreed to permit NAFTA investors that own a bank or securities firm in Mexico to form
a financial group that will be eligible to expand into other financial services sectors under
Mexican law.
C"ross-border  Financial Services.  Each NAFTA country must permit its citizens and
residents to purchase financial services from financial service providers located in the territory of
other NAFTA countries.  In addition, a NAFTA country may not adopt any new measures
restricting cross-border financial services that are permitted by that NAFTA country on the date
the NAFTA enters into force, except to the extent set out in that country's reservations to the
Financial Services Chapter.
Rule of Origin.  In general, any citizen, resident or business formed under the laws of a
NAFTA country is entitled to enjoy the benefits of the Agreement.  This means that financial
institutions from outside the NAFTA region may be able to use subsidiaries established in one
NAFTA country (such as the United States or Canada) to gain access to another NAFTA country
(such as Mexico).  However, Canada has reserved the right to deny the benefits of the Agreement
to any entity that is not ultimatelv controlled by persons from NAFTA countries.
64 This material  is taken  from Bachman  (1993) which  presents  an excellent  review  of the financial  provisions  of
NAFTA.44
Transparency.  NAFTA countries must ensure that interested persons have advance
notice of and an opportunity to comment on laws, regulations. and other measures relating to
financial services.  Regulatory authorities of each NAFTA country must act upon applications
relating to the provision of financial services within 120 days of completion or. if not practicable.
with a reasonable period thereafter.
New Financial Services and Data Processing.  Each NAFTA country must permit
regulated financial institutions from every other NAFTA country: (i) to provide any new
financial service of a type similar to those services that the first country permits its own financial
institutions, in like circumstances, to provide under its domestic law; and (ii) to transfer
information  for data processing into and out of its territory.
Dispute Settlement.  A NAFTA country -- and. in certain circumstances. a NAFTA
investor -- may bring a financial service dispute against another NAFTA country.  Such disputes
are generally subject to the same procedures that govern other disputes under the NAFTA, except
that the parties to a financial services dispute may require one or more members of the arbitral
panel hearing the dispute to be a financial services expert.
Reservations and Exclusions.  A NAFTA country may take actions that are inconsistent
with the standards of the Agreement if those actions are taken: (1) for "prudential" reasons (e.g..
safety and soundness regulation); (2) in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies; or (3)
subject to certain conditions, in pursuit of exchange rate policies.  A NAFTA country, state or
province may continue to enforce any other provision of law existing on the date the NAFTA
enters into force that is inconsistent with the Agreement by taking a "reservation" for that
provision.  Mexico may at any time adopt and maintain measures that otherwise may be
inconsistent with the Agreement, as long as they are in accord with special NAFTA rules
regarding the establishment and operation of financial institutions in Mexico.45
Annex 1
Some detail on Commercial  Banking Spreads  in Mexico'
Diespite  the de-regulation of the banking system (see Glaessner (1  993-B). Ramachandran
(1991), C:arstens  (1992) for reviews) including the removal of most explicit and implicit taxes on
bank intermediation, the privatization of banks, and the ratification of NAFTA, the efficiency and
competitiveness of the banking sector remains suspect. Further analysis of the causes of high
banking mnargins  and differences across banks can help in establishing an agenda of reforms. The
key sources of banking margins 2 in Mexico include: operating costs, remaining implicit taxes such
as provisioning for overdue loans or capital adequacy standards, contributions to Mexico's system
of deposit insurance FOBAPROA and profits. In addition, the dispersion in lending rates does not
only reflect credit risk differentials and costs of processing smaller versus larger loans, it is also
related to certain defects in Mexico's institutional infrastructure in support of credit markets.
Operating and other Non-Financial Costs: Mexican commercial banks, taken as a group,
still appear to be somewhat inefficient, as operating expenses as a percent of average assets are
about 4.4 percent relative to an average of about 2 percent in developed countries (similar
conclusions when measuring efficiency through interest margins). 3 Moreover, across Mexico's 18
financial groups there is significant variation in operating costs inclusive of personnel costs.  In
some baniks,  operating costs are as high as 10 percent of average assets and personnel costs often
account for a substantial portion of these costs. In addition, administrative costs are high due to a
lack of automation in bank operations and lack of good cost accounting systems. However, there is
increasirng  evidence that this situation is changing as many newly formed financial groups are
sheddingy  labor arid making investments to begin to reduce operating costs.
A more recent and detailed study undertaken by the CNB that applies the methodology for
decomposing banking spreads originally developed by Hanson and Rocha (1986) confirms the fact
that nonfinancial costs are an extremely important component of spreads within the banking
system. These costs were found to account for about 70 percent of the gross financial margins in
1993. WVithin  this set of costs the most important were associated with personnel and
administrative costs. More specifically, non-financial costs per asset are shown to be 2-3 times
Some parts of this annex  draw heavily  upon the work  of the CNB  "Los Margenes  de Intermediacion  en Mexico
(documento  de Trabajo)"  July 1993.
2 Note that  with the formation  of financial  groups the analysis below  gives only a partial  picture  of efficiency  since
it does not examine  the consolidated  financial  position  of each financial  group. To the extent that  commercial
banking  operations  still  account for  the majority  of the groups  assets  and income  this will not be a bad
approximnation.  However.  this situation  is changing  rapidly  and in some  groups  the operations  of the Casa de Bolsa
would  be important  to take into  account  (e.g. Accival).
'Comparisons  of various  measures  of efficiency  of provision  of banking  services  can be difficult  to interpret  and
must be viewed  with caution  since  Mexico  employs  inflation  accounting  and accounting  standards  applied  to
commercial  banks. in preparation  of financial  statements,  do not even accord  with Mexican  GAAP. At 4.4% of
assets, Mexico's  interest  margin  was higher  than all but one of 17 developing  and 16 developing  countries
according  to several  sources: "Thailand  Financial  Sector  Study" World  Bank,  May 25, 1990;  and "Measuring
Banking  Sector  Efficiency"  Dimitri  Vittas,  April 1991,  World  Bank.46
higher for all Mexican banks vis a vis US and Canadian institutions. 4 Within this set, the most
important were associated with personnel and administrative costs.
Provisioning and Capital Adequacy: Relative to the 1  980s, the Mexican banking system is
subject to far fewer explicit and implicit taxes on its operations through such devices as reserve
requirements. liquidity coefficients etc.  Moreover, those liquidity coefficients which are still in
effect and which apply to foreign borrowing do not likely have a large impact on spreads. 5
However, application of tougher supervision procedures and capital adequacy standards or
provisioning policies have contributed to increases in banking spreads. 6 Over the 1991-92 period
the increase in overdue loans on the balance sheets of Mexican banks has been quite dramatic,
increasing by 1  12 percent alone between June 1991 - June 1992. For the banking system as a
whole.  Table 3 shows that overdue loans as a percentage of total loans had risen to 4.82 percent on
average for all banks. However, the disparity in this ratio has grown as seen in the increase in the
standard deviation from 1.22 in 1990 to 2.20 by 1992. Chart 1 suggests that for regional banks
such as Promex, Banco del Centro or Banco del Oriente these ratios have exceeded 6 percent, while
even the largest banks (e.g. Banamex, Bancomer,and Serfin) have ratios over 4 percent.
Comparable ratios at most U.S. commercial banks are about 2-3 percent.
More recent data in 1993 suggests that by June 1993 overdue loans (as measured by cartera
vencida) as a percentage of total loans had grown to 7.2 percent. Moreover, over this period the
disparity across banks has continued to grow (see Table 1) as some banks had ratios of close to 20
percent while many had ratios in the 6-8 percent range. The largest problems have existed in the
credit card and project lending portfolios of some of the commercial banks.
At the same time as overdue and non-performing loans have grown and associated
provisions have increased which has increased the pressures to increase margins, capital adequacy
Regression  analysis  undertaken  by CNB  suggests  that about 90 percent of the variation  of the financial  margin
nominalized  assets  can be explained  by variation  in non-financial  costs (normalized  by total banks  assets).
i This restriction  requires  investing  15  percent  of the 20 percent of total borrowing  in foreign  currency  in interest
earning  liquid  foreign  instruments.  Given  that  yield curves in foreign  countries  are not that steep, relaxing  this
requirement  would  not result in  enormous  savings  to the banks  that could be passed  on in terms of substantially
lower rates. This is of course  less  true if commercial  banks could on-lend  the funds  within Mexico,  however,  this
would  only increase  the exchange  rate risk  being undertaken  if loans  were denominated  in local or foreign  currencv.
In the latter  case,  questions  arise if the final borrower  could manage peso/dollar  risk. Contributions  to the deposit
insurance  fund if capitalized  would  add less  than .5 percent  to spreads  and is therefore  also significant.
" Formally,  application  of such  prudential  regulations  could result in either  a reduction  in return  offered on liabilities
or an increase  in lending  rates depending  upon the elasticity  of demand  for funds by bank  borrowers  and the
elasticity  of supply  in the case of those lending  to banks  (i.e. depositors).
7  Extreme  care needs to be taken  in making  inter-country  comparisons  between  these  ratios in Mexico  vs. other
countries. Accounting  principles  in Mexico  applied  to commercial  banks  are not coincidental  with either Mexican
GAAP  or US GAAP. The method  for determining  overdue loans is different  than in the United  States. In Mexico.
.caartera  vencida"  refers  to loans  where  one payment  has been missed  whereas  in the United  States,  a loan is
classified  as non-performing  after it has been  in non-accrual  for a certain  period,  say 90 days. Thus,  the comparison
may overstate  the deterioration  in Mexican  loan portfolios.47
regulations for commercial banks have been toughened to 8 percent on a risk adjusted basis. These
factors have therefore, contributed to the high commercial banking spreads present in Mexico.
Finallv. while capitalization of the banking system is adequate. at least 5 banks had capitalization
levels below this limit in 1992 and only one during 1993.
Several of the underlying reasons for the growth in overdue loans of commercial banks
could result in increasing pressure for high banking spreads.
First, the level of domestic real interest rates (i.e. CETES) h-ad  to increase to sterilize the
large inflows of foreign exchange needed to finance the current account deficit given the much
smaller domestic budget surplus at current real exchange rates. In this environment, the strongest
firms have funded themselves offshore. This has increasingly caused a deterioration in the
creditworthiness of commercial bank borrowers. 8
Second, the increase in the real cost of capital to firms coupled with the more open trade
regime has also resulted in increasing company failure rates, particularly among small and medium
enterprises in the tradeable goods sector. These firms have been subject to reductions in sales
revenue given the appreciation in the real exchange rate. At the same time, financing costs have
risen in real terns.
'Finally,  personnel responsible for credit provision at some Mexican commercial banks lack
necessaiy skills and there is a lack of centralized information on borrowers so that financial
institutions can cross-check borrowers, particularly in the provision of consumer banking services
(e.g. credit cards). Both have contributed to the increase in non-performing assets.
Profits and Competitveness:  Despite the problems of high operating costs and increasing
non-performing loans and the difficulty theoretically in linking profitability and spreads (see
Hanson and Rocha (1986) and Musalem (1992)), measures of Mexican commercial bank
profitability are high.  For example. interest margins as a percent of average assets for Mexican
banks have been at 4.4 percent or more. In 1992. these margins in Mexico were substantially
higher ihan in the case of the United States or Canada (see Table 1).  Other measures of
commercial  bank return are also high, such as return on assets or return on equity. Moreover, in the
aftermnath  of the de-regulation of commercial banks and privatization in 1989-91, lending rates have
not fallen as much as might have been expected given banking deregulation that involved removal
of all forms of domestic reserve requirements. This appears to be the case even if increased
provisioning against different forns  of sub-standard assets and more stringent risk adjusted capital
requirements  are taken into account -- the other major source of spreads besides operating costs. 9
Remaining liquidity requirements associated with commercial bank foreign borrowing and
payments to the commercial bank insurance fund (i.e. FOBAPROA) have been far less important.
It should be noted that non-banking services offered by financial groups have been growing very quickly in such
areas as factoring and leasing, thereby compensating for some of the reduction in interest income that banks have
experienced due to the increase in the non-performing loans in their credit portfolios.
"Time clid  not permit a complete investigation resulting in a decomposition of spreads for financial conglomerates
on a consolidated basis. This would be the correct way to estimate the annualized effect on spreads implied by
enforcing different prudential regulations applied to the holding and entities within the group.48
Other policy changes such as the relaxation of the foreign borrowing constraint from 10
percent to 20 percent of liabilities has helped to permit commercial banks to show strong operatinia
profits.  However, the exchange rate risks being undertaken by final borrowers or the commercial
banks themselves are, of course, not deducted from the bank's capital. In part, the high profitability
reflects a lack of competition due to insufficient threat of entry (i.e. contestability) thus far either by
domestic institutions or foreign entities. To a far lesser extent, the profitability may partly reflect
the righ-t  of commercial banks to allocate lower cost development credit (inclusive of longer
maturity as well as interest rates).
Institutional Infrastructure: In addition to the problems associated with the perceived risks
of banks and bank operating margins, the large range of lending rates for borrowers of different
sizes can be linked to several defects in Mexico's institutional infrastructure and legal system.
First, the lack of centralized reliable infornation about the credit histories of small, relative
to large borrowers, makes monitoring of such borrowers more costly for all banks.
Second, problems with registries for movable capital of all types (i.e. vehicles. machinery.
certain types of inventories, etc.) limit the set of credit contracts that can underlay a well secured
loan; this is because it is impossible for lenders to ensure that they have a unique claim on these
types of collateral (i.e. perfect a security interest).
Third, problems exist in the courts with re-possession procedures in the case of defaults by
borrowers even when special processes intended to be rapid such as "proceso ejecutivo" are
specified.'  The potential importance of this issue in combination with the lack of well functioning
registries can be seen from the observed effective rates charged for leasing transactions.  Leasing
companies are able to obtain financing at rates equal to those charged large enterprises (i.e. 28 to 30
percent). and then, in effect, provide this rate to the SME's through the lease. Such leasing
arrangements can, indeed. provide access to financing to SME's that would otherwise have no such
access at all, even at 40 percent.
Fourth, some types of key functions which relate to preparation of a loan secured by
collateral are legally monopolized. An example is the notary function that is an inherited right in
Mexico that confers upon a subset of all lawyers. This legalized monopoly increases the costs of
perfecting a security interest in all forms of fixed or movable capital.
Finally, this broad continuum of lending rates between small and large borrowers is due
to lack of a broad and efficient securities market inclusive of a large class of institutional
"' Work done by the World Bank in the context  of a Private Sector Assessment Study (1993) discusses  these issues
in some detail.
This interpretation is legitimate because leasing transactions in Mexico were not subject to special tax advantages.49
investors that would permit these firms to access directly long and short term savings through
securities offerings.' 2
TABLE  I
Overdue  Loans as a Percent  of Total Loans
For Mexican  Banks  (End of Period)
Nonperforming  Loans/
Total Loans  (in Percent)
Name of Banks  1990  1991  1992  1993
ALL BANKS  2.04  3.15  4.69  7.20
1. Banks with national coverage  Tier 1 2/  1.89  2.95  4.58  7.2
Banamex  1.35  3.20  4.65  8.0
Bancomer  2.43  2.70  4.51  6.4
I.  Banks with multi-regional  2.42  3.28  4.82  7.25
coverage  - Tier IJ
Banca Serfin  1.97  3.92  5.70  8.0
Banco Internacional  2.50  2.68  4.48  7.9
Multibanco Comermex  1.29  1.96  4.81  6.8
Banco Mexicano  3.91  4.56  4.29  6.3
111.  Banks with multi-regional coverage  '  2.25  2.84  3.58  5.32
Banca Confia  2.23  3.55  4.59  4.8
Banca Cremi  1.09  1.72  3.27  5.5
Banco BCH  4.79  5.32  6.13  -
Banco de Credito y Servicios  1.58  1.98  2.84  -
Banco del Atlantico  1.89  2.70  4.13  8.2
Banpais  3.21  3.19  2.29  4.4
Multibanco Mercantil Probursa  0.97  1.39  1.83  3.7
IV. Banks with regional coverage 2/  2.71  4.60  6.65  9.05
Banca Proinex  3.26  4.56  6.87  7.7
Banco del Centro  5.04  5.20  9.08  15.6
Banco Mercantil del Norte  1.52  2.21  2.30  3.9
Banco del Noroeste  1.53  2.86  4.81  -
Banco del Oriente  2.21  8.14  10.17  9.0
V. Other Banks  10.45
Banco Obrero  1.06  10.42  16.29  20.8
Citibank  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.1
BANKS AVERAGE`  2.38  3.44  4.82  7.48
BANKS STANDARD DEVIATION  1.22  1.66  2.20  4.55
Source:  Cornision  Nacional  Bancaria
Notes:
1,: As of September 1992
2/: Average for banks in the same group
3/: Excludes category vs. Other Banks
4/: As of June 1993
12 This point  is discussed  in Section  IV of the paper.50
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